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At the start of this research project, the price for light sweet crude oil was $95 per 
BBL.  Four months later, it had soared to $134 per BBL (Energy Information 
Administration [EIA], 2008) with speculation of higher prices yet to come.  During this 
short period, news media outlets were saturated with reports of looming recession, record 
gasoline prices, rising food prices, struggling citizens, permanent airline route closures, 
and many other undesirable effects.  This is not the first time the world has experienced 
oil shocks, in fact during the past fifty years, there have been 14 significant oil supply 
disruptions, mostly related to political or military conflict in the Middle East (Geller, 
2003).  Reasons for rising price levels today are debated and disputed among industry 
experts and range from speculators driving prices, and oil companies hoarding profits, to 
turmoil and supply shortages in the Middle East and elsewhere.  One particular argument 
that is pushing its way to the forefront that was not as hot an issue during previous oil 
shocks is that the world is rapidly approaching the inevitable peaking of oil production or 
has already surpassed it, depending on the source.   
Global reserves fluctuate with the discovery of new oil fields and extraction 
technologies but sites that are easily discovered and have easy recovery are declining.  
This is leading to the condition that discoveries are decreasing over time while demand is 
increasing.  The fact that 80 percent of today’s oil reserves were discovered before 1973 
supports this argument (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE], 2004).  Also, according to 
DOE (2004) reserves are being depleted at three times the rate of discovery, and since 
2000 the cost of finding and developing new oil sources has risen by fifteen percent 
annually (Lynch, 2005).  This isn’t to suggest that world reserves are running out in a few 
years, there is enough to last up to decades depending on how tolerant the market is to 
drilling deeper, in more inhospitable places, and for higher extraction and refining costs.  
With the issues of accessibility and the emergence of India and China, the literature 
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suggests that the days of cheap accessible crude oil are now behind us, and this is the first 
time mankind has ever been faced with this new reality. 
The implications of this new reality for America and the Department of Defense 
(DoD) are profound, especially since according to Lovins (2005), DoD is the largest 
single consumer of petroleum at 1.8 percent of total U.S. consumption.  What 
Hornitschek (2006) contends however is that this figure does not even recognize indirect 
dependencies from military industrial supply, contractor support, commercial logistics, 
and installation requirements.  Therefore, 1.8 percent may be a conservatively low 
estimate.  An important question becomes, how can DoD contribute to creating a society 
which is less dependent on foreign oil while simultaneously maintaining the energy 
resources and capabilities to provide national security? 
This report offers that DoD has the R&D capabilities, ability to create a sense of 
urgency, ability to form guiding coalitions, and political influence to secure it’s own long 
term existence, and push society transformation along the renewable energy path to 
energy independence.  The initial intent of this report was to champion solar energy 
projects as the best renewable energy source for DoD to focus efforts, however, research 
indicated that wind energy and geothermal energy have played a large role thus far in 
DoD’s transformation and are still more cost effective than solar in most large scale 
applications.  What was also realized however is that solar has been the best choice in 
many niche applications for DoD where wind and geothermal have been inappropriate or 
less cost effective.  The number of implemented and future DoD niche solar applications 
has grown tremendously over the past 10 years and the scope of this report will center on 
the importance of purchasing and developing solar energy technology while not ignoring 
the merits of wind and geothermal. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of the MBA professional report is to analyze the solar industry and 
the opportunities it might present for DoD to serve as an example for a national 
transformation toward a new energy future.  It will also identify the economic and 
geological issues affecting conventional energy supply and demand, adoption of 
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renewable energy, as well as the potential threats to national security should America 
continue on its current dependency of foreign-supplied fossil fuels.   
C. SCOPE 
This report focuses primarily on solar energy technology as a reliable energy 
alternative for DoD based on solar modular capability, cost, supply chain efficiency, 
global availability, and wide array of realized and potential applications.  However, it is 
important to point out that any sound renewable energy strategy for DoD must comprise a 
portfolio of all the different renewable energy choices.  The Energy Policy Act of 2005 
specifically recognizes renewable energy as energy from “solar, wind, biomass, landfill 
gas, ocean (including tidal, wave, current, and thermal), geothermal, municipal solid 
waste, or new hydroelectric generation capacity achieved from increased efficiency or 
additions of new capacity at an existing hydroelectric project” (Energy Policy Act, 2005).   
DoD’s focus has been on solar, wind and geothermal and leads all federal 
agencies by deriving approximately 10 percent of its energy from these renewable 
sources.  This report discusses how DoD might become a leader in solar technology 
innovation, use, and diffusion through strategic partnerships, and strong actions to affect 
market supply and demand.  The arguments presented may also be applied to other 
renewable energy choices.  New energy technologies are beginning to make a difference 
today, and may make a bigger difference tomorrow. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this research project consists of 4 components.  First is 
a literature review of numerous books, scholarly journals, government reports, and other 
library resources to examine renewable energy and solar science, market and 
environmental characteristics of energy economies, and government and private activities 
in environmental and renewable energy programs.  Next, are analyses of supply chains 
for solar energy and other energy sources, as well as financial realities facing DoD in the 
current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan as they relate to energy supply for military 
operations.  The third component focuses on the nature of uncertainty in new 
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technologies and how it impacts renewable energy development.  Also covered is an 
analysis of technology learning and diffusion amid uncertainty and market barriers, and 
what actions DoD might take to drive diffusion of niche solar energy applications.  The 
final component uses theories of networking and alliance building to successfully manage 
risk, build strategies for research and development, and diffuse technology through 
shared communication and synergistic partnerships. 
E. SOLAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGY 
The sun's heat and light provide an abundant source of energy that can be 
harnessed in many ways. There are a variety of technologies that have been developed to 
take advantage of solar energy. These include: solar thermal electricity, passive solar 
heating and day lighting, photovoltaic systems, and solar hot water. 
1. Solar Thermal Electricity 
Solar thermal energy (STE) systems use the sun’s energy to superheat a fluid 
(normally water) and generate steam to drive a turbine and generator.  The solar energy is 
concentrated either by a field of parabolic mirrors, dish-shaped collectors or large flat 
mirrors.  STE systems have been around for two decades, successfully demonstrating 
capability in the California deserts using parabolic mirrors and steam turbines (Mills & 
Morgan, 2007).  The newest STE option recently developed commercially is the Compact 
Linear Fresnel Reflector (CLFR) system which is a linear system using long steam pipe 
receivers on towers, illuminated by long flat mirrors (heliostats) below (Mills & Morgan, 
2007).  The appealing feature of STE is the low cost energy storage in artificial thermal 
reservoirs.  This low cost water-based thermal storage is expected to be commercialized 
within two years (Mills & Morgan, 2007) and is more attractive than the limited battery 
storage options of photovoltaic systems. 
2. Passive Solar Heating and Day-lighting 
Passive solar systems take advantage of the fact that the south sides of buildings 
receive the most sunlight.  Buildings designed for passive solar heating usually have large 
windows facing south (National Renewable Energy Laboratory [NREL], 2007).  This 
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system also takes advantage of the heat retention properties of certain materials by 
storing heat in floors and walls.  For example, a Trombe wall is a thick south-facing wall, 
which is painted black and made of a heat absorbing material such as stone or metal.  The 
wall absorbs heat during the daytime, and a glass or plastic glazing installed a few inches 
away limits the heat loss after sunset (NREL, 2006).  A portion of the retained heat is 
transferred into the interior of the building, although most is lost to the outside. 
A sunspace (which is much like a greenhouse) is also built on the south side of a 
building. As sunlight passes through glass or other glazing, it warms the sunspace. The 
heat captured is then ventilated throughout the building (NREL, 2006).  Sunspaces are 
useful add-ons for buildings that were not originally designed for passive solar heating.  
Passive solar systems are also useful for day-lighting applications that allow sunlight to 
naturally brighten building interiors. 
3. Photovoltaic Systems 
Commonly known as solar cells, photovoltaic (PV) materials convert light energy 
into electrical energy and are commonly found in calculators, road signs, and satellites 
among other household and industrial applications.  When sunlight is absorbed into the 
semiconducting materials, the solar energy knocks electrons loose from their atoms, 
creating electron flow and electricity (U.S. Department of Energy: Office of Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy [EERE], 2006).  PV cells come in many sizes and 
shapes, and forty cells (NREL, 2007) are often connected together to form PV modules 
that can be up to several feet long and a few feet wide. These modules are mounted in PV 
arrays of different sizes depending on desired power output. 
These flat-plate PV arrays can be mounted at a fixed angle facing south, or they 
can be mounted on a tracking device that follows the sun, allowing them to capture the 
most sunlight over the course of a day.  About 10 to 20 PV arrays can provide enough 
power for a typical household (NREL, 2007).  Hundreds of arrays can be connected to 
form a single large PV system for large electric utility or industrial applications. 
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Thin film solar cells use layers of semiconductor materials only a few 
micrometers thick. Thin film technology has made it possible for solar cells to now 
double as rooftop shingles, roof tiles, building facades, or the glazing for skylights or 
atria (EERE, 2006). 
Discussed so far are flat PV arrays, however in order to cut down on the amount 
of expensive semiconductor materials used, some PV systems are designed to operate 
with concentrated sunlight.  Photovoltaic cells are built into concentrating collectors that 
use a lens to focus the sunlight onto the cells, and require more sophisticated tracking 
devices. 
The first solar cells, built in the 1950s, had efficiencies of less than 4 percent  
Technological advances since then have made typical commercial solar cells 15 percent 
efficient (NREL, 2007) but still, eighty-five percent of the sunlight that strikes a cell is 
reflected or absorbed by the material.  Increasing this efficiency is still an important 
priority for NREL researchers and DOE laboratories.   
4. Solar Hot Water 
One of the most cost-effective ways to include renewable technologies into a 
building is by incorporating solar hot water.  Typical water heating systems reduce the 
need for conventional water heating by about two-thirds, minimizing the expense of 
electricity or fossil fuels (EERE, 2006).  Most solar water heating systems for buildings 
have two main parts; a solar collector and a storage tank.  Flat-plate collectors are most 
common (NREL, 2006). 
Solar water heaters use the sun to heat either water or a heat-transfer fluid like 
anti-freeze in the collector.  The collector, mounted on the roof, consists of a thin, flat, 
rectangular box with a transparent cover that faces the sun.  Small tubes run through the 
box and carry the fluid to be heated.  The tubes are attached to an absorber plate, which is 
painted black to absorb the heat.  As heat builds up in the collector, it heats the fluid 
passing through the tubes (NREL, 2006). 
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Heated water is then held in the storage tank ready for use, with a conventional 
system providing additional heating as necessary.  The tank can be a modified standard 
water heater, but it’s usually much larger and very well insulated.  
Solar water heating systems can be either active or passive, but the most common 
are active systems.  Active systems rely on pumps to move the liquid between the 
collector and the storage tank, while passive systems rely on gravity and the tendency for 

























II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to establish a strong fundamental understanding of renewable energy 
technology, policy, economics, and perceived energy challenges of the future, an 
extensive review of books, government reports, and academic journals was conducted.  
This chapter reviews the main body of literature consulted; what is common among all 
sources is the credibility and experience each author has earned from decades of insider 
knowledge, research, and experience.  The authors of this literature have held varying 
high-level positions in the industry, including federal and state government energy policy 
positions, national energy councils and think tanks, oil company executive positions, and 
environmental agencies.  Each has authored numerous books and articles on the subject 
of renewable energy, and is regarded as an expert in the field. 
B. A THOUSAND BARRELS A SECOND: THE COMING OIL BREAK 
POINT AND THE CHALLENGES FACING AN ENERGY DEPENDENT 
WORLD — TERTZAKIAN 
When President George W. Bush declared “America is addicted to oil” in a 2006 
State of the Union Address, it seemed like a stunning remark from such an oil-friendly 
president, but, two years, later it is arguably an enormous understatement.  With the 
ongoing crisis in the Middle East showing no end in sight and the unprecedented 
industrial growth of population giants India and China, it seems the world is likely on the 
cusp of an energy “breaking point” (Tertzakian, 2007).  According to the literature, 
breaking points are crucial junctures marked by dramatic changes in the way energy is 
used.  During a breakpoint and subsequent 10 to 20-year rebalancing, nations struggle for 
answers while frustrated consumers struggle and complain until the economy adapts as 
science surges with new innovation and discovery.  The reality is that the world is not 
really running out of oil, just cheap oil.  Most of the easily accessible “elephant” oil fields 
on the globe have already been discovered, but plenty of smaller pockets and remote 
large fields are still being found.  The problem facing oil users is that new reserves are in 
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geographically and politically inhospitable places.  This, coupled with the rapid increase 
in demand for imported oil, is contributing to growing global risk and certainly United 
States national security risk. 
1. Energy Cycle 
To illustrate the concept of an energy breaking point, it is helpful to consider the 
energy cycle every economy experiences.  Figure 1 shows four main stages of the cycle.  
Beginning with the top, every economy increases its energy demand as it grows, as a 
result, dependencies on a primary energy source form and take root, as a frenzy of new 
products and services flourish.  Eventually, the primary energy source becomes scarce 
and pressure buildup begins.  There are several forces that contribute to the pressure 
buildup.  Geopolitical forces for example are undeniably important as scavengers hunt for 
the dwindling energy source.  Environmental and social forces play an important role as 
pollution, deforestation, or species endangerment become forefront. 
 
Figure 1.   Energy Evolution Cycle [From: Tertzakian]. 
 
Eventually pressure leads to a break point where conservation, search for new 
sources, taxes, and incentives among other behaviors and actions drive the economy into 
rebalancing.  Technologies emerge and substitutions ease the effects of the breakpoint 
and rebalance the economy.  Tertzakian (2007) contends that all economies are locked 
into this cycle regardless of the primary energy source they are thriving on.   
This model explains historical energy cycles and stands the test of time and 
history.  One particular world energy transition to note is the transition away from whale 
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oil, which was used for making candles and for illuminating lamps 150 years ago, as 
prices rose to shocking levels in response to dwindling whale count and increasingly 
remote harvesting locations.  Eventually, the price shock was so unbearable for the world 
economy that a radical new technology emerged in 1849 (Tertzakian, 2007) that was 
cheaper and more desirable – kerosene.  By the time the kerosene burner was invented in 
1857 (Tertzakian, 2007), the whaling industry was dead. 
The pressure buildup, break, and rebalancing of the oil energy market during the 
1970s is a more recent testament to the lessons learned about energy source addiction.  
Triggered by the 1973 oil embargo by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) and fed by global tension, drastic government action and consumer frustration, 
(Tertzakian, 2007) the world energy pressure rose and peaked.  By the second oil shock 
of 1979 as a result of more turmoil and political upheaval in the middle east, oil prices 
rose to unbearable levels and action was required on the demand side as much as the 
supply side.  Rebalancing occurred from 1980 to 1986 through conservation policies, fuel 
economy, and growth in coal, nuclear, natural gas, and renewables.  The world emerged 
from the break point in 1986 looking much better off from an energy portfolio standpoint 
than in 1973 (Tertzakian, 2007).  The United States energy balancing result depicted in 
Figure 2 below takes into account all end use markets (transportation and electricity 
generation) and extended energy stability modestly, but much more balanced portfolios 
emerged from such nations as Japan and the United Kingdom. 
 
Figure 2.   Comparison of U.S. Energy Mix in 1973 and 2005 [After: Tertkazian]. 
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2. Breaking Standards 
Once standards are set, they are difficult to change.  The period of 1800 to 1920 
was the most influential period in our modern era (Tertkazian, 2006).  We are fixed in our 
approaches and options because of the technology developed in those days.  The 
QWERTY keyboard standard was developed in 1872 to prevent typewriter hammers of 
frequently used letters from jamming (Tertzakian, 2007).  There are probably more 
efficient ways to arrange the keys on a keyboard now since jamming hammers today is 
no longer a serious problem, however standards are hard to change and it is likely we will 
live with this standard far into the future.  This report offers that breaking the QWERTY 
standard would be a much easier endeavor than breaking the world energy standard. 
3. Insights 
Three major insights were gained from A Thousand Barrels a Second.  First, it is 
astonishing how the historical choices made in the past have created deep-rooted 
pathways and firm standards that severely limit the energy options available to the U.S. 
and DoD today.  Second, geopolitical forces are again inspiring a global scramble to 
stake out energy claims and launching the world into a new era of volatility and risk.  
Finally, Tertzakian (2007) argues that new technologies will not provide the “magic 
bullet” to solve the world energy problems, and that energy technologies take decades to 
make an impact, unlike technologies in other industries.  This may have been true in the 
past but it is purely speculative.  To suggest that future rates of innovation and 
technological impact will follow the same general course as history shows might be 
excessively pessimistic.  One can argue that the next great energy invention may not even 
be perceivable by mankind today.  For example, a stunning breakthrough in fusion may 
truly be a “magic bullet.”   
C. BEYOND OIL: THE VIEW FROM HUBBERT’S PEAK — DEFFEYES 
M. King Hubbert was a well-known geologist, most famous for predicting peak 
oil production.  In his technique, he used mathematics to arrive at the answer as to when 
the world would reach its peak oil production.  Using this data, his first prediction, in 
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1958, was that world oil production would peak in 1970.  In 1969, he revised that number 
to argue that world oil production would peak in the year 2000.  
1. Analysis 
In the literature, Beyond Oil: The View From Hubbert’s Peak, discussed in detail 
was the methodology that Hubbert used to predict his peak oil estimates.  At first, U.S. oil 
production is examined on a yearly basis.  Hubbert plotted oil production versus 
cumulative oil production between 1859 to 2003.  His analysis was fairly straightforward 
because it used a straight line in order to simplify the results.  Early on, the oil production 
data rested well above the line of best fit, but by 1958, U.S. oil production practically 
mirrored the line of best fit. As Deffeyes (2005) suggests, if you buy into this method, 
then it is easy to determine the point at which U.S. oil production will end.  One of the 
criticisms toward this approach is that it only takes into consideration the undiscovered 
fraction of oil (because it was the simplest idea that could be tested) and nothing else 
mattered (Deffeyes, 2005).  The author then suggests even that with 3-D seismic, deeper-
water drilling, computer imaging and increased gas prices, there seems to be no abrupt 
dramatic improvement that will put an immediate bend in the straight line. 
Examining the world picture, using the same format as mentioned above, the peak 
production point has moved to the right.  Thus, the world’s peak oil production would 
have peaked in late 2005, or early 2006.  As the scarcity of oil begins to become realized, 
the prices of oil will likely continue to soar and DoD could find itself financially 
constrained in meeting national threats. 
In addition to discussing Hubbert’s method, this literature also discusses energy 
sources like coal, uranium, hydrogen and tar-sand oil.  For each particular energy source, 
it discusses the benefits, environmental drawbacks, and the potential each one has in 
meeting U.S. energy requirements.  While these sources of energy are available, they are 
not the long term solution.  With current knowledge, it seems only renewable energy 
sources can provide clean, efficient, and secure energy as DoD looks to the future. 
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2.  Insights 
The main point of this literature was to show that we have, if you use and accept 
the Hubbert method, passed the peak production point for oil.  However, there are some 
who criticize this method.  Corsi (2005) suggests that Hubbert’s Peak is a failed theory.  
According to the Hubbert, peak oil production occurred in late 2005, or early 2006.  Corsi 
(2005) points out that in 2005, the EIA estimated that there was 1.28 trillion barrels of 
proven oil reserves worldwide, more that ever before in human history, despite decades 
of increased usage.  Data estimates on world proven reserves of oil taken from the EIA 
website dated January 1, 2007, report that the Oil & Gas Journal estimated 1.317 trillion 
barrels of oil (EIA, 2007).  This data estimate actually shows an increase in the proven 
world oil reserves and not the decrease Hubbert predicted should happen. ExxonMobil 
also discredits Hubbert’s view.  ExxonMobil claims that this theory does not match 
reality.  ExxonMobil does agree that oil is a finite resource but because it is so incredibly 
large, peak oil will not occur for decades to come (ExxonMobil, n.d.).  The author 
attempts to make a strong case that time is critically short to correct the pending energy 
crisis and that only a decisive change towards a diverse renewable energy portfolio is the 
answer to our future energy needs but as one can see, there are some who completely 
disagree.  Somewhere in between both arguments lies the truth.  Nevertheless, renewable 
energy should be developed as soon as possible to be ready for the inevitability of peak 
oil. 
D. CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION — JONES & BALDWIN 
To achieve a corporate environmental policy is not an easy task.  First you must 
be able to create a framework from which your policy can develop.  According to Jones 
and Baldwin (1994), in order to create a sound environmental policy, eight variables 
should be considered: 
• Increasing costs related to the environment. 
• Consumer demand and market competition. 
• Government regulation and enforcement practices. 
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• Actions and rulings by courts in support of environmental laws and 
challenges. 
• Environmental interest group pressure. 
• Public opinion. 
• News media attention to corporate environmental problems. 
• Culturally-based ethnic norms and perceptions of moral behavior. 
Also discussed were five steps organizations can take to achieve environmental 
excellence: 
• Develop program organization, staffing and resources. 
• Develop an environmental policy with full participation of corporate 
management. 
• Accomplish an environmental audit. 
• Develop an implementation program including strong technical, legal and 
educational programs. 
• Monitor trends and support similar interests. 
1. Addressing Externalities 
Another area covered was the environmental and political regulations to 
compensate for externalities.  Here it discussed both positive and negative externalities 
and how that can affect corporate policy.  Also, there is an effective argument made on 
how regulation can drastically influence corporate policy by examining the U.S. coal 
mining industry safety record from 1932 to 1976.  This analysis shows that when 
regulators got involved in dictating safety rules, the mishap rates fell substantially. 
2. Trends in Environmental Policy 
Finally, future trends in corporate environmental policy were discussed. One 
corporate trend addressed was that there will be greater efforts to save on energy and 
waste disposal through research, investment and development of better technology.  
Another trend addressed was that corporations will begin to give more attention to public 
relations, in addition to advertising, about positive corporate environmental activities and 
benefits to local communities (Jones & Baldwin, 1994).  In total, 16 trends were 
identified and they can be readily observed in today’s corporate environment.  In 
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addition, 12 government regulatory trends were addressed.  One of the most important 
trends addressed was that there is going to be increased efforts by government to set 
performance standards to which corporations must comply but not specifying the exact 
technology that should be used to achieve the end result (Jones & Baldwin, 1994).   All 
of the trends mentioned are readily apparent in today’s environment. 
3.  Insights 
This book provided some interesting thoughts on corporate environmental policy 
and where it was headed into the future.  As the push for going “green” continues to pick 
up steam throughout U.S. industry, the recommendations and guidance that were 
mentioned for creating a company’s corporate strategy should be taken into consideration 
and implemented.  Using these recommendations companies perhaps might be able to 
deliver a complete and robust environmental policy which can contribute to a decrease in 
costs and an increase in revenue. 
E. ENERGY REVOLUTION: POLICIES FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE — 
GELLER 
1. Barriers 
In his 2003 book, Geller provides an insightful guide to understanding the 
practical policy options for government and non-government leaders to create energy 
efficiency and replace fossil fuels. However, there are barriers limiting adoption of 
renewable energy and environmental efficiency for individual consumers, commercial 
industry, and the government including DoD.  Generally speaking, the barriers can be 
categorized as technical, human behavior, market failures and flaws, and public policy 
institutions (Geller, 2003).  With the exception of perhaps tax policies, these barriers all 
have similar deterrent effects on both public and non-public sectors.  Financing 
opportunities are available to DoD, but in a more advantageous manner than to non-
government entities.  This will be discussed in detail later.  Strong financial incentives 
and regulations can overcome these barriers, especially with the actions and support of a 
large government agency such as DoD.  Strong financial incentives and regulations 
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should be pushed to overcome these barriers and an agency as large and powerful as the 
DoD might be able to become a catalyst for change. 
a. Technical Barriers 
A glaring shortfall in the budding renewable energy industry is the limited 
supply, storage, and distribution infrastructure.  For example, photovoltaic systems are 
relatively easy to setup and stand alone when used for small decentralized applications.  
However, for large scale centralized solar energy systems like solar thermal heating, 
storage and distribution to customers are still large hurdles to leap.  Complimentary 
technologies like lithium ion battery science and energy transmission technologies for 
example must advance rapidly enough to keep pace with energy generation technology. 
Adoption of environmental efficiency is impeded by insufficient 
information and training, and quality problems (Geller, 2003).  As a simple example, 
architects and builders may lack know-how to design and build energy efficient 
buildings.  Also in existing older buildings, poor quality may be revealed in improperly 
installed or oversized air conditioning units which increase energy consumption.  Energy 
efficient lamps and lighting ballasts produced low light output and premature failure 
when initially introduced but has improved a great deal since. 
b. Human Behavior 
It is often difficult for policy makers, planners and decision makers to 
consider the long-term effects of their actions and choices.  The high initial capital costs 
of renewable energy systems and environmental efficiency are often a deterrent for 
adopting these technologies, and “least initial cost” thinking prevails over “least life-
cycle” cost thinking.  In the U.S., energy costs represent one to two percent of the total 
costs of production for manufacturing industries other than energy intensive industries 
like aluminum, steel and paper manufacturing (Geller, 2003).  With this in mind, many 
companies do not take advantage of opportunities to raise their long-term profits by 
increasing energy productivity and efficiency, but instead focus on least initial cost for  
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improvements.  Similarly, Defense contractors are usually awarded on the basis of 
lowest-price bids, thus encouraging cutting corners to save money except when certain 
energy codes must be met.   
The deterrent of high up front costs has somewhat eased since the author 
reported these findings over 2002 and 2003.  Five years later, new financing strategies are 
finally making it possible for interested users to benefit from renewable energy 
technology.  Recently, several companies have shown dedication to dispel the up-front 
costs.  The two popular strategies that have emerged are the use of loans to amortize costs 
over a systems entire life span, and Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) (Winnie, 2008).  
Purchasers who amortize are given the option by some lenders to refinance an entire 
home mortgage and incorporate solar costs into the regular monthly payments.  PPAs 
work similar to how cable TV is paid for.  Suppliers install the necessary equipment, and 
the customer pays for the services made available at a fixed price over the term of the 
contract.  This could become beneficial over the long term for customers locking in a rate 
for 30 years while utility prices rise.   The reality still is that solar energy costs about two 
to five times more than normal residential electricity rates depending on geographical 
location (Winnie, 2008).  But, when one considers the ability for owners to market 
properties as “green” and charge a higher rent or sales price, as well as enjoying a fixed 
utility rate, subsidies, rebates and tax incentives, this barrier is being softened. 
c. Market Failures and Flaws 
Externalities are the unintended consequences of certain market activities 
that impact society in a negative or positive fashion; they are also market failures or 
flaws.  These flaws tie into human behavior barriers mentioned above.  According to 
Geller (2003), the prime motivator for government and industry to put off adoption of 
renewable energy is their focus on short-term profits (or savings) rather than longer term 
social and economic benefits.  What may also be a factor is that political and 
governmental bodies have not internalized the externalities and created national-level 
mandatory solutions to correct them.  
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The additional costs to society for continued dependence on fossil fuels 
are not usually factored when comparing energy costs of today with renewable energy 
costs.  Additionally, electricity prices often do not reflect the full cost of electricity grid 
and generator extension (Geller, 2003).  This and the political failure to include the social 
and environmental externalities of air, water, and land pollution; climate change; military 
expenditures to protect oil supplies and fight wars; and economic upheaval caused by oil 
price shocks leads to negligent policymaking, continued excessive fossil fuel 
consumption, and disagreement about which renewable energy technologies provide the 
best cost benefits.  
The two prevailing market solutions that have been offered in order to 
correct this market flaw and encourage oil and gas companies, refineries and other major 
industrial sectors to reduce carbon dioxide emission are a carbon tax, and a “cap and 
trade system.”  Carbon taxes are taxes applied by a government to a utility or company 
for exceeding a certain cap on carbon dioxide emissions.  Under a “cap-and-trade” 
system, a government rations the amount of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 
that businesses emit by issuing permits.  A business wanting to emit more than its 
entitlement can buy the right to do so from another business that emits less than its 
entitlement (Liebreich, 2008).  In 2008, Daniel Yergin, Chairman of Cambridge Energy 
Research Associates, stated that economists generally favor a carbon tax over a “cap-a-
trade” system to incentivize reduced emissions (Dittrick, 2008).  The United States has 
neither of these programs on a national level.  There are state and local level carbon tax 
policies and a volunteer “cap-and-trade” system facilitated by the Chicago Climate 
Exchange (CCX) however.  Members of CCX include Ford Motor Company and other 
companies, counties, city municipalities, state governments, and universities.  There are 
no DoD organizations voluntarily participating in the CCX “cape-and-trade” system at 
the time of this writing.  Perhaps the reason that corporations and non-government 
organizations are voluntarily participating is that they value the favorable trust and 
reputation gained with the public by participating, whereas government agencies are 
motivated by politics and congressional mandates.  If this is true, a political failure has 
delayed national adoption of a carbon-limiting program. 
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European Union (EU) launched a national “cap-and-trade” system in 
2005.  The system was supposed to be a financial incentive for industries to clean up their 
act and meet commitments of the Kyoto Protocol.  Results of a study completed in April 
2008 by Oslo-based Point Carbon revealed that carbon dioxide emission actually rose 
about one percent each year despite the program (Abboud, 2008).  Point Carbon’s report 
stated that the caps were too high and that there were too many government permits 
issued (Abboud, 2008).  Proponents of both systems are optimistic that national-level 
coordination of market solutions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and adopting 
renewable energy will be legislated in the next four to five years. 
d. Public Policy Institutions 
Prices, regulations and tax barriers have played a major role in deterring 
mainstream renewable energy acceptance.  For consumers and businesses with limited 
capital, renewable energy systems are unattractive due to the long payback on the 
investment, although with current oil prices climbing and depending on the prevailing 
alternatives’ prices, the tide may be changing since Geller made this argument.  For 
renewable energy systems, virtually all costs are realized up front and banks are still 
reluctant to provide favorable long term financing due to limited understanding and low 
confidence in the technology (Geller, 2003).  This will be overcome only when 
renewable energy becomes widely adopted, which cannot occur until long term financing 
becomes more available, and the vicious cycle continues.   
The utilities industry is a powerful economic segment in the United States 
which creates onerous barriers such as expensive interconnection requirements, poor 
buyback rates of excess production (or refusal), and burdensome application procedures 
(Geller, 2003).  The majority of political voices favor continued fossil fuel use due to 
familiarity, tradition and the inherent economic strength and political clout of 
conventional energy.  Since the renewable energy industry is immature and much less 
influential, vested interests in fossil fuels can exert political pressure to block policies 
favorable to renewable energy.  In the U.S., the subsidizing of conventional energy 
sources is an enormous barrier to overcome.  From 1947 to 1999, the government 
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subsidized utility companies in excess of $145 billion (CY$99).  Equally shocking, tax 
incentives amounted to $140 billion during 1968 to 2000 (CY$00) (Geller, 2003). 
Current tax policy concerning renewable energy projects requires that 
capital costs be depreciated over thirty years or more.  Again, with no fuel costs and 
virtually all renewable energy costs realized up front, this can be very challenging except 
for very well funded or financed organizations.  On the contrary, businesses are allowed 
to deduct fossil fuel purchases from revenues when calculating income taxes (Geller, 
2003). 
F. DOD CURRENT POSITION IN THE RENEWABLE ENERGY MARKET: 
REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT RESEARCH AND POLICY SOURCES 
So what are the implications of fossil fuel dependence for DoD?  As oil prices 
continue to rise amid growing demand and shrinking supply, DoD will likely continue to 
pay the price required to complete its missions.  If supplies become severely constrained 
either by political, geological and economic factors, DoD will certainly get its 
requirements filled before the public for the sake of national security.   
Reflecting greater awareness of this and greater concern about the consequences 
fossil fuels-induced global warming will have on national security, the Defense 
Authorization Act of 2007 calls for huge increases by the Pentagon in its use of 
renewable energy resources.  By 2025, DoD is "to produce or procure not less than 25%" 
of its total energy needs from renewable sources.  Currently, DoD derives about  9 
percent of its total energy needs from renewables, nearly double that of the U.S. as a 
whole (Hilburn, 2007). Even more impressive, as of October 2007, the U.S. Air Force 
ranked forth in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Green Power 
Partnership Top 25 for “green” power consumption (EPA, 2007).  It also ranked number 
one among all government organizations.  This is certainly a step in the right direction for 
the DoD.  The consumption of renewable energy is evident in the EPA ranking and by 
seeing the solar and wind structures at such sites as U.S. Army’s Fort Bliss, Texas and 
Kirtland Air Force Base. 
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But, is DoD also a research and innovation force in the renewable energy 
industry?  Agencies such as Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and 
Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (CERL) are contributing to new 
technology development and improvement, although to date, only a very small fraction, 
approximately two percent on average, of each agency’s total research and development 
(R&D) budget goes into renewable energy development.   The majority of R&D funding 
has been dedicated to weapons systems and homeland security since 2001.   
White House strategy experts, however, have recently been placing more 
recognition on the significance that energy dependence has on homeland security.  The 
2006 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) for instance contains much more language 
on this correlation than the 2002 strategy.  In 2002, just one short paragraph stated that 
the U.S. desires to expand economic liberty and prosperity by promoting clean energy 
development.  There is no further mention of energy, energy security, or renewable 
energy technology development.  On the other hand, the 2006 NSS defines a 
comprehensive energy strategy that puts a priority on reducing our reliance on foreign 
energy sources, while acknowledging that energy dependence is irresponsible and not 
sustainable. Also in NSS 2006, the White House vows to accelerate deployment of clean 
energy technologies including revolutionary solar and wind technologies in order to 
diversify energy markets and ensure national security (NSS, 2006). 
This thesis explores how DoD may be able to increase R&D spending, accelerate 
adoption of business processes and innovative strategies of successful firms like Toyota, 
General Electric (GE) and British Petroleum (BP), and learn from the successes of 
foreign governments like Brazil, Sweden, Germany, and Japan.  Doing so will arguably 
improve DoD’s operational capacity and combat power through energy efficiency.  It can 
hardly be argued that DoD’s effectiveness in waging combat recently is flawed.  
However, it might be easy to find flaw in its efficiency to do so.  During this decade in 
the corporate world, there has been strong evidence that energy efficiency-minded culture 
and operations correlate strongly to corporate efficiency, survivability and profitability 
(Esty & Winston, 2006). Esty and Winston were granted access to environmental 
professionals, factory managers, board members, Chief Operating Officers (COO) and 
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Chief Executive Officers (CEO) at more than 100 leading companies across a diverse 
array of industries. Their exploration revealed several dozen of these companies such as 
Johnson & Johnson, BP, 3M, DuPont, Nike, and Sony using environmental strategy to 
innovate, create value, and achieve competitive advantage.  The inference that DoD can 
certainly benefit from this amid increasingly greater downward financial pressure will be 
discussed in later chapters. 
G. WIND AND SOLAR POWER SYSTEMS — PATEL 
This particular literature addressed the technical aspects of wind and solar power 
systems and provided an overview of the current energy industry.  It addressed the 
current situations with China and India, who are rapidly becoming more demanding 
customers of increased energy needs.  For example, in 2005, the worldwide demand of 15 
trillion kWh was projected to reach 19 trillion kWh by 2015, which constitutes a 
worldwide average growth of 2.6 percent.  The dilemma, however, is on how to meet that 
demand.   
1. Wind Power Development 
Wind power offers one way to combat the increase in demand and cost for 
electricity.  One of the arguments suggesting that wind power is becoming more cost 
effective is that new technology development is reducing installation costs and increasing 
energy efficiency.  For example, the variable speed operation of electric generators has 
allowed wind systems to capture the maximum amount of energy possible.  One of the 
interesting comparisons that this book makes is the development and installation of wind 
power systems between Europe and the United States.  While the United States is 
beginning to generate more electricity from wind power, it lags far behind Europe in 
added capacity.  Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of this difference.  Finally, it 
discusses the components of wind power systems such as the tower structure, rotors, 
electrical generator and sensors and controls.  
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Figure 3.   Added and Cumulative Wind Power Capacity in Europe, U.S. and the 
World [From: Patel]. 
 
2. Solar Power Development  
This book also provides an in-depth analysis of photovoltaic (PV) power systems.  
It discussed how the module and arrays are constructed, how the sun intensity, angle,  
load matching for maximum power, and operating temperature can all influence the 
design of these systems.  In addition, it also discusses at length energy storage techniques 
such as battery storage.  According to the literature, there are two types of battery 
storage: primary storage and secondary storage (aka. rechargeable battery).  The primary 
storage converts chemical energy into electric energy but because it is nonreversible it 
must be discarded after each use (Patel, 2006).  The secondary storage is reversible so it 
can be used over and over again.  Six major types of rechargeable batteries are discussed 
,comparing cost, efficiency, and how they react to certain environmental conditions.  
Finally, there is a brief discussion on the future of renewable energy.  It addresses 
the increasing world demand for electricity, reduction in production costs, the forecasted 
growth rates for both solar and wind technology, and the current legislation that directly 
affects renewable energy.  To summarize the impact that renewable energies can have, 
the book makes the case of the 2003 blackout across the northeast and Canada. This 
blackout affected 50 million people and the cost of the outage to the U.S. economy was 
estimated at $10 billion, excluding personal losses (Patel, 2006).  Can we afford another 
blackout of the same magnitude or worse? 
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3. Insights 
Wind and Solar Power Systems: Design, Analysis and Operation was written as a 
technical textbook, however it did provide a beginner’s look into how wind and solar 
power systems are produced, the materials needed and how they can have an impact in 
today’s energy market.  As the production costs continue to decline for both wind and 
solar systems and become more competitive with the fossil fuel energies, it becomes 
easier to create a diverse portfolio of renewable energy systems. 
H. THE SOLAR ECONOMY — SCHEER 
This book provides an in-depth look at the comparison between the fossil fuel and 
solar supply chain.  Using a variety of data, charts and graphs, it suggests that when the 
total cost is compared between the fossil fuel supply chain and the solar supply chain, 
solar power provides a considerable benefit in the reduction of both economic and 
environmental costs.  One way in which to argue this point is to examine the economic 
logic of the solar supply chain.  For example, the solar power supply chain is extremely 
short compared to the complex supply chain of fossil fuels because it converts the sun’s 
rays directly into energy, which then can be inserted into the electrical grid or stand-alone 
system.  As the supply chain becomes shorter, it creates smaller distinct processing steps, 
which result in lower infrastructure costs.   
Another argument to support the attractiveness of solar energy is based on the 
political cost of fuel and resource conflict.  For this particular argument, the case for 
transitioning to solar power (and other renewable energy sources) is made by discussing 
the limited oil and mineral reserves that the world faces along with the ever increasing 
energy consumption by developing nations like India and China.  In the political arena, as 
the dwindling of fossil fuel supplies continue, it will create or break political alliances as 
countries seek to avoid fuel starvation.  
A third area that is examined is the profitability of renewable energy and 
resources.  Here the case is made that the quicker and more comprehensively fossil 
energy and resources can be supplanted by their solar counterparts, the greater the cost 
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saving to society and the less strain on government budgets threatened by ever higher 
clean-up costs in the wake of fossil-fuel-induced catastrophe.  In addition, an in-depth 
analysis of solar energy costs, both on the operational and the initial capital investment is 
examined. 
Finally, a deeper look at the impact of solar energy beyond the energy grid is 
examined in which the author poses the argument that the potential impact stand-alone 
energy systems can have on products.  For example, if mobile phone batteries could be 
recharged using solar power, then the users would never have to worry about running out 
of power, or if laptop computers had solar cells in their lids, they could be recharging the 
batteries while in use (Scheer, 2005).   
One of the main points that must be taken into consideration is that when the costs 
of solar power and fossil fuels are compared, in whole and on a level field, solar power 
provides a more economical and environmental benefit than fossil fuels in certain 
applications.  From a DoD stand point, solar power offers an opportunity to drastically 
reduce operations and maintenance costs to which the money that was being spent on 
these costs could be used to improve battlefield technology to give our military forces the 
competitive edge they will need in the future. By examining the potential impact solar 
power can have in our lives and in our economy, there becomes a sense of urgency to 
convert many energy requirements to solar power before it is too late. 
I. SOLAR REVOLUTION: THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE GLOBAL ENERGY INDUSTRY — BRADFORD 
The field of alternative energy sources is growing in scope and volume and each 
choice carries practical considerations and obstacles to adoption.  Travis Bradford, in 
Solar Revolution: The Economic Transformation of the Global Energy Industry, suggests 
that solar energy will inevitably become the most economic solution for most energy 
applications in the future due to certain projected cost advantages compared to other 
energy sources.  He also acknowledges that solar energy is not quite competitive enough  
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yet, but is optimistic about the rapid innovation and development of the field.  The 
specifics of solar and current electric utility economics and the impact on DoD will be 
discussed in later chapters. 
1. Risk Factors for Status Quo 
The combination of fossil fuel peaking, potential supply disruption, and an aging 
electricity grid puts the future of conventional energy at risk in every part of the energy 
supply chain.  Not responding to the dire realities the world is facing may spell disaster 
and invite the consequences of these risks.  Bradford (2006) argues that with over six 
billion people on the planet today, and projections for ten billion by 2050, resource 
scarcity will plague humanity at an accelerating rate causing greater gaps between rich 
and poor, and more international conflict.  He speculates that along with these risks of 
inaction are increased food shortages, pollution, climate change and the famine and 
devastation each brings.  This is not the first time that this has been pondered.  In 1968, 
The Population Bomb by Paul Ehrlich warned that in the 1970s the world would 
experience famines resulting in hundreds of millions of people starving to death.  The 
same fear cropped up again at the United Nations World Food Summit in 1996 (Simon, 
1996).  Thankfully, such terrible scenarios have not materialized as a result of 
productivity innovations and substitutes.  Therefore, although resource scarcity may not 
be as substantial a concern as suggested by the author, the aging electricity grid might 
pose the greatest risk.  From numerous major blackouts, to the fuel crisis of 1973-1974 
and the Three Mile Island accident, there have been very few years when the grid has not 
had to deal with crisis (Bradford, 2006).  Since federal deregulation of utilities, the 
likelihood of action and funding for grid upgrades has diminished.  DoD should consider 
the national security challenges these risks spell for the nation’s future. 
2. Solar Energy Storage Solutions 
With productive sunshine in the range of 6 to 10 hours on average each day in the 
sunniest regions of the world, the combination of all solar technologies – centralized PV, 
remote PV, solar thermal electricity, and concentrating solar power all face the 
challenging limitation of storage.  There are technical limits to widespread adoption 
 28
beyond 15 percent of total U.S. grid capacity without the added inclusion of energy 
storage solutions (Bradford, 2006).  Large-scale energy-storage applications are being 
tested in the form of pumped hydro, compressed air, hydrogen fuel cells, or advanced 
flywheels to supply power during periods of low or no sun (Bradford, 2006).  An indirect 
storage mechanism is to produce excess solar electricity during the daytime, sell back the 
excess to the grid, then using the grid to supply periods of low or no sun.  Hence, the grid 
becomes the storage medium.  Small-scale portable applications rely mainly on portable 
batteries. 
An innovative idea has been suggested by Sanyo Electric to eliminate the need for 
storage altogether.  The basic idea is that a global infrastructure project would 
interconnect the whole world’s electric grid through efficient, high capacity transmission 
lines.  This alternative, called Project Genesis would allow the day side of the world to 
sell power to the night side of the world.  The proposal has numerous problems – for 
example, the transmission lines would have to be added to the EIA’s list of vulnerable 
energy “chokepoints”—but highlights that there is innovating thinking going on 
(Bradford, 2006).  Bob Fisherman, a senior manager at Ausra, Inc., developers of solar 
thermal electricity technology, believes that thermal storage is the most efficient and cost 
effective mode of storage to date (personal communication, March 25, 2008).  Ausra’s 
systems rely on large super-insulated tanks to store the pressurized super-heated water to 
allow several hours of steam to generators, long after the sun has set or become cloud 
covered. 
Whatever direction storage may be heading in into the future, the options 
discussed are complementary technologies that have unbounded headroom for 
improvement.  Innovation and development will play a large part in the rate of future 
solar energy adoption. 
3. Accelerating Adoption 
Bradford (2006) argues that the prime mover for accelerating adoption of solar 
energy is through encouragement of social benefits through coordinated government and 
industry efforts.  Specifically, tax rebates, cash subsidies, mandates for utilities to accept 
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excess generated electricity all enable and encourage market acceptance.  Additionally, 
pollution penalties, taxes, and removal of subsidies for conventional oil and gas sources 
would accelerate adoption.  Japan and Germany represent success stories where 
government and industry worked synergistically to create demand and enable market 
access of solar energy through subsidies, rebates and other incentives.  Their robust solar 
energy programs are decades ahead of the U.S.  According to Bradford (2006), the U.S. 
has much room for improvement in this area.  The DOE, primarily through NREL, spent 
$212 million in 2004 for renewable energy research and development.  Besides this, and 
a law congress passed in 2005 for a two year 30 percent residential tax credit, research 
and development and incentive funding has primarily been led by state governments and 
private sector initiatives. 
4. Insights 
Maintaining the status quo is arguably not the way the world should handle the 
looming energy crisis and all the chaos predicted to result.  There are risks being taken 
now in the U.S., mostly by commercial enterprises, to force out the next solution.  In the 
case of creating a future solar world far beyond the technical capabilities of today, market 
influences and timing alone can create and deliver the necessary innovative technologies 
in which all the risks of uncertainty and failure are born by the private sector. 
Alternatively, a powerful government agency like DoD can bear the risk, or a cooperative 
achievement blending the two. 
J. GREEN TO GOLD: HOW SMART COMPANIES USE 
ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, CREATE VALUE, 
AND BUILD COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE – ESTY & WINSTON 
There is a green wave sweeping the business world and it is defining how twenty-
first century corporate leaders may improve their company’s performance, efficiency and 
sustainability by developing key partnerships, and integrating environmental stewardship 
into their corporate culture.   The green wave encompasses the use of renewable energy 
sources as well as reducing harmful outputs to the environment.  Esty and Winston 
(2006) assert that there is logic for making environmental thinking a core part of strategy, 
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and that globalization gives the environmental imperative greater prominence.  The 
business case for environmental thinking focuses on capitalizing on the upside benefits, 
managing the downside risks, while taking a value-based concern for environmental 
stewardship (Esty & Winston, 2006).  Although it seems logical to apply these activities 
to the corporate world, other non-governmental and governmental agencies like DoD 
might benefit from the insights gained from studying these issues. 
There are natural and human pressures bearing down on companies and DoD 
today that were much less prominent decades ago.  From ozone depletion, to climate 
change, fresh water shortages, deforestation, and pollution, every action and decision by 
private and public leaders are subject to more watchful scrutiny than ever before.  One of 
the key arguments in Green to Gold is that successful companies enjoy greater 
efficiencies and profit when they see emerging issues ahead of the pack and are better 
prepared to handle unpredictable forces (Esty & Winston, 2006).  But, one can counter-
argue quite easily that successful companies cannot really see emerging issues, but rather 
make bold choices and decisions that turn out favorable.  Armed with hindsight, a firm 
might be inclined to say they predicted and overcame emerging issues, but in reality, they 
were probably just lucky. Merit should be given to strong leadership and adaptability 
however.  Rapidly becoming the world’s largest automaker, Toyota Motor Corporation 
laid down fundamental principals in 1935 (Stewart & Raman, 2007) that allowed them to 
prepare themselves for the energy challenges of the twenty-first century.  In the early 
1990’s, when gasoline was cheap, and making the environment a major theme was 
against the grain, they began work on the first hybrid electric-gasoline automobile.  The 
Prius was introduced worldwide in 2001, and by 2004, when Prius earned the honor of 
Motor Trend’s Car of the Year (Esty & Winston, 2006), consumers were willing to wait 
months to get their hands on one. 
1. Eco Advantage 
The success of the Prius can be attributed to what Esty and Winston (2006) refer 
to as “Eco Advantage.”  They propose that the leading edge companies go beyond the 
basics of environmental compliance by: 
• Pushing suppliers to be better environmental stewards. 
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• Designing innovative products that are environment friendly. 
• Tracking their environmental performance. 
• Partnering with non-governmental organizations (NGO) and other 
stakeholders to find innovative solutions to energy problems and 
environmental problems. 
• Building an Eco Advantage culture to engage all employees in the vision. 
The bottom line to Eco Advantage is that stakeholders (watchdogs, agenda setters, 
business partners, communities, etc.) are increasing in number, power and diversity (Esty 
& Winston, 2006) and the importance of have an Eco Advantage mindset cannot be 
understated.  Organizations should look for opportunities to connect with critical players, 
friendly and hostile, and build relationships and networks that may strengthen this 
advantage, even before they are needed. 
2. Strategy 
Finding critical connections and building relationships are the cornerstones of an 
effective organizational strategy that seeks Eco Advantage.  Esty and Winston (2006) 
emphasize the importance of building the potential for upside benefits through meeting or 
exceeding stakeholder needs and by building a reputation of trust and loyalty to 
environmental preservation.  For example, watchdog agencies like Greenpeace, Heritage 
Foundation and World Wildlife Fund have the power to paint a favorable or unfavorable 
image of companies that can critically impact customer loyalty and sustainability.  Also, 
the authors contend that managing downside risks improves resource productivity, cuts 
environmental and regulatory burden, and increases value chain efficiency by lowering 
costs upstream and downstream.   
Establishing an Eco Advantage mindset starts with top leadership.  They must set 
the vision, establish tough goals, and persist.  Those companies that do the right thing for 
the sake of fulfilling the vision and meeting goals without indication of immediate benefit 
minimize adversarial relationships with regulators and minimize risk of environmental-
related disaster. This lesson can be learned from the incident that befell Dupont in 1997.  
A Conoco oil tanker (owned by Dupont) collided with a tugboat near Lake Charles, 
Louisiana, opening up a hundred-foot gash in the tanker.  Fortunately, not a drop of oil 
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was spilled because Dupont made an expensive commitment in 1990 to build only double 
hull ships (Esty & Winston, 2006).  Executives believed, during a time when green issues 
were off the radar screen, that the reduction in risk to the company and the environment 
was worth it. 
3. Insights   
Alternative energy and environmental awareness are gaining market and policy-
maker attention due to national security concerns, pollution, and climate change 
concerns.  Organizations that adopt strategies for building Eco Advantage are tapping 
into a new competitive advantage and minimizing risk.  Moreover, environmental 
efficiency seems to equate to business efficiency and success in many other areas.   
DoD is arguably the most effective war fighting institution in the world, yet its 
efficiency in developing weapons, managing programs, deploying forces and making 
decisions may not garner such praise.  There may be important actions DoD can take to 
create value, innovate and improve efficiency. 
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III.  SOLAR POWER IMPACT IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Solar power and other alternative energy sources are becoming more popular as 
oil and gas prices continue to rise.  For example, over the past few years, according to the 
European PV industry, global PV cell production has been growing annually by 30 
percent and is expected to continue on this upward trend (Patel, 2006) while a survey 
conducted by Photon International in 2006 states that annual growth was closer to 40 
percent (Hariharan, Sato, & Liu, 2008).  In addition, the Prometheus Institute for 
Sustainable Development estimates that PV costs will decrease by 40 percent over the 
next three years due to combined technology advances and the increase in polysilicon 
supply (Renewable Energy World, 2007).  Figure 4 illustrates the current and projected 
trend in PV energy efficiency, and as a comparison, it also illustrates the efficiency for 
biomass plants.  Note that while PV solar power does not match the efficiency of biomass 
plants, its efficiency is steadily improving.  As further research and technological 
improvements occur within the industry, solar power can, perhaps, become a significant 
part of DoD’s portfolio in creating a long-term strategic energy vision.  In 2006, a new 
breakthrough in efficiency took place as Boeing-Spectrolab used a concentrator solar cell 




Figure 4.   PV versus Biomass Efficiency [From: U.S. Department of Energy]. 
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1. Logic of Solar Power 
In many ways, solar energy is already priced competitively with coal and oil when 
long-term fuel costs and infrastructure maintenance costs are considered.  Additionally, 
most of the world regions that DoD has been operating in since the end of World War II 
have the most solar energy production per unit area and unreliable electricity 
infrastructures.  Figure 5 below depicts solar energy abundance in North Africa, the 
Middle East, and South Asia.  The 2006 NSS continues to place these regions very high 
on the list of national interests.  Specifically, in choosing leadership over isolationism, the 
U.S. is committed to free and fair trade, and global economic growth; and vows to oppose 
tyrannical regimes such as Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, Syria, Cuba, 
Belarus, Burma, and Zimbabwe among others.  Iran and Syria are singled out as key 
states that harbor terrorists, seek weapons of mass destruction (WMD), threaten Israel, 





Figure 5.   Ideal locations for Solar Power (CSP) [After: Marker]. 
 
 Similarly, the U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) is a layered approach 
to the defense of the nation and its interests and is derived and designed to execute the 
NSS.  One crucially important operational capability of the NDS is projecting and 
sustaining forces in distant anti-access environments (NDS, 2005).  These are remote, 
hostile environments where fuel, electricity, potable water and supplies are very difficult 
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to acquire locally.  DoD endeavors to extensively project and sustain forces in remote 
environments with uninterrupted resources.  Portable solar energy systems are ideally 
suited to provide reliable energy to operating forces in these remote environments 
because they do not require the extensive support or have a major footprint like other 
renewable energy sources such as geothermal or wind.  Also, long term main operating 
bases can benefit from larger, less portable systems like solar thermal energy plants and 
provide the uninterrupted energy needed for electricity, fuel, and potable water 
generation. 
B. SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS 
1.  Fossil Fuels 
The fossil fuel supply chain begins with the countries that possess the reserves. 
The main concern for DoD is that most of the leading countries that harness the majority 
of the proven world oil reserves are not considered close allies of the United States.  For 
example, as of January 1, 2007, of the top twenty countries that have proven oil reserves, 
only one, Canada, could be considered a close ally1.  Unfortunately, Canada only 
possesses 13.6 percent while the remaining countries, excluding the United States, hold 
an overwhelming 84.7 percent of the proven world oil reserves (EIA, 2007).  Recently, 
the extraction of fossil fuels has become a very complex and capital-intensive process as 
sources diminish (Scheer, 2005).  Once the fuel is extracted from the ground, it must then 
be transported, usually over vast distances via pipeline, rail, sea or road, to a refinery 
where it is then processed and then stored.  The next step in the supply chain is to 
transport the refined fuel to oil-fired power stations via tanker truck or pipelines.  At this 
point, the fuel is converted into high voltage electricity and imported into the national 
                                                 
1 The vast majority of Canada’s oil reserves are located in Alberta, Canada in the form of oil sands.  
From a production stand point are attractive economically because, according to Canadian Oil Sands Trust, 
their first quarter production costs in 2008 were $35.93 a barrel (Canadian Oil Sands Trust, 2008).  This is 
still well below the current price of crude oil which has broken the $110/barrel mark.  However, the 
extraction and refinement of the oil sands (aka: tar sands) can have a significant cost if the environmental 
cost is associated with their production due to the carbon dioxide emissions produced during the production 
phases.  
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grid.  Once in the national grid, the electricity is converted from high to low voltage in 
order to be able to distribute it to the general population.  
The United States, because of the relative proximity, purchases over 50 percent of 
Venezuela’s exported oil (Walsh, 2007).  This dependence of oil from a country that is 
extremely critical of the United States should be a concern in our national strategy.  
However, this dependence could also be used as a leverage tool by the U.S. in foreign 
policy.  Venezuela’s economy is almost solely dependent upon oil revenues as they make 
up 80 percent of the country’s export revenues, which contribute to the funding of social 
programs, public works and defense (Alvarez, 2006).  Teslik (2007) suggests with so 
much dependence on American purchasing of Venezuelan oil at 60 percent of their 
exports while the Venezuelan imports only contribute to 11 percent of U.S. imports, the 
U.S. clearly has leverage to influence current Venezuelan policy. Unfortunately, 
Venezuela is looking to broaden its ties with China and other clients in order to diversify 
and lessen the country’s dependence on the United States (Alvarez, 2006). Still, 
Venezuelan dependence on the U.S. will continue for the foreseeable future, so the 
potential for any radical action by Venezuela is remote. However, the dependence on 
Venezuelan oil is still important and, if the flow of oil was cut off, an impact would be 
felt across America; higher oil prices could possibly stunt or slow economic growth.   
Solar power, with its emerging solar technologies, can play an important role in reducing 
the dependence of importing our energy requirements from nations that are considered 
hostile to the U.S.. 
2. Solar Power 
Solar power may offer DoD an unique way to re-examine its strategy on 
providing reliable energy, operational planning and long term sustainability.  The solar 
supply chain is very different from fossil fuels.  In fact, most renewable energy sources 
provide a much shorter supply chain than fossil fuel choices.  Solar power’s supply chain 
is quite simple.  The sun light is absorbed by PV cells, converted into low-voltage 
electricity and then delivered to the end user.  Because there are little or no moving parts,  
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the operation and maintenance costs of these systems are relatively small.  In addition, 
PV solar cells are very quiet and do not release any harmful emissions into the 
atmosphere.   
The economic logic of solar power as an energy provider is clear.  The shorter the 
supply chain – i.e., the smaller the number of distinct processing steps involved, the 
greater the scope for reducing the costs of energy generation (Scheer, 2005).  Smaller 
supply chains have the potential to offer more productivity.  For example, because the 
fossil fuel supply chain is considerably larger than that of solar power, it will result in the 
loss of the final energy output.  To illustrate this point, the process of delivering energy 
through solar power is more efficient – fewer processes – than fossil fuels so the end 
result is that solar power systems will not require the same amount of energy input to 
make them produce electricity.   Figure 6 provides a visual comparison between the solar 
power supply chain and the traditional conventional fuel supply chains. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Comparison of Energy Supply Chains [From: Scheer]. 
 
3. Summary 
If we take the traditional mindset to energy consumption and production, our 
society may not be able to cope with an energy crisis that some predict is about to 
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materialize.  Solar energy offers a unique opportunity to break that mindset and establish 
a long range strategy for energy consumption.  DoD perhaps should realize by comparing 
the solar power supply chain against that of fossil fuels, that solar power has distinct 
advantages over fossil fuels.  Case in point, as Figure 6 clearly shows, solar power energy 
can be more rapidly deployed because it does not require the extensive infrastructure that 
is required to support the fossil fuel energy consumption.  In addition, DoD should also 
take into the consideration the costs associated with the solar and fossil fuel supply 
chains.  After a thorough and fair analysis, Scheer (2005) states the results will clearly be 
in favor of solar energy.  Finally, solar power can help, along with other alternative 
energy sources, secure DoD’s energy requirements well into the future. 
C. FINANCIAL IMPACT ON DOD 
1. Iraq and Afghanistan 
 The United States military doctrine was completely altered on September 11, 
2001.  DoD was now faced with a new challenge that was unlike anything they had been 
accustomed to before.  Our enemy was no longer a nation but an ideology.  Now, there 
would be no more distinguishable frontlines like those of the previous wars we had 
fought.  As American and coalition forces engaged the terrorists in Afghanistan and then 
later in Iraq, it was becoming more inevitable that our forces could be there for quite 
some time.  In addition, time would soon show that there would have to be a significant 
presence of coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to win the war on terror.  As 
with any large scale operation, it will require a lot of energy to sustain this presence.  
Solar power can be a key ingredient for the solution to the energy dilemma in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
a. Benefits of Solar Power 
Solar power, as with other renewable energies, can be a major player in 
the energy industry as long as we can let go of our current method of thinking that fossil 
fuel is still the cheapest and easiest method to use.  As stated before, one of the clear 
benefits of solar power is the short supply chain it has associated with it.  This short 
supply chain for solar power can have a significant impact on the operational strains our 
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forces have in supplying bases and outposts with energy.  For example, if bases in Iraq 
and Afghanistan were to use solar power to sustain their energy requirements, it would 
significantly reduce the cost of transportation of refueling convoys, their escorts, 
maintenance, and the manpower cost.  In July, 2006 Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, the 
highest-ranking Marine Corps officer in Iraq’s Anbar Province, characterized the 
development of solar and wind power, “By reducing the need for [petroleum-based fuels] 
at our outlying bases, we can decrease the frequency of logistic convoys on the road, 
thereby reducing the danger to our Marines, soldiers, and sailors” (Crowley et al., 2007). 
To further this point, Dimotakis et al. (2006) stated that the present logistic supply chain 
was designed at a time when “behind the front lines” denoted more-or-less safe terrain 
and further stated that fuel supply vehicles are not armored and, as a consequence, 
present a vulnerable target and costly liability in terms of lives and treasure for U.S. 
forces.  Dimotakis et al. (2006) also suggests that the greatest driver for reducing fuel lies 
in not the reduction of the direct costs of fuel itself, but the reduction of the attendant 
indirect costs of logistics to supply the fuel, the cost of fuel required to deliver the fuel 
needed, as well as enhancements in tactics that would accompany increased vehicular 
range, if fuel consumption were to be decreased on a given type of vehicle.  Figure 7 
displays the cost in 2006 that is associated with transporting fuel in Iraq to sustain Army 
training and contingency operations.  Notice in Figure 7 that of the $13.68/gallon fuel 
costs, $11.33 or 82 percent of the total cost is attributed to support costs. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Fuel Handling and Support Costs [From: Army Installation Energy 
Security and Independence Conference]. 
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To help clarify the enormous costs for one year, DESC Europe, in 2006, 
provided over 103 million gallons of JP-8, Diesel and MOGAS to northern Iraq utilizing 
17,802 trucks which, if put end to end, would stretch from Washington, D.C. to 
Wilmington, Delaware2 (DESC Factbook, 2006).  Can DoD afford such high costs on a 
sustained basis3?  
A study was conducted on the economic viability of a stand-alone solar 
photovoltaic system to a diesel-powered system in India in 2002.  Kolhe, Kolhe, & Joshi 
(2002) decided that the only way to create fair analysis because their cost structures are 
entirely different was to examine the life-cycle costs of each to include: operational and 
maintenance costs, recurring and non-recurring costs, sensitivity to discount rates, diesel 
fuel costs, solar insulation, reliability, and solar array costs.  In this analysis, the authors 
concluded that PV is the lower cost option at a daily energy demand of up to 15 kWh 
under unfavorable economic conditions, but up to 68 kWh with favorable economic 
conditions (Kolhe et al., 2002).  To put this in perspective for DoD, a typical AC unit 
consumes about 3.5 kWh, so it could be more cost effective to run an AC unit (a niche 
application) for 20 hours using PV energy than diesel fuel.  This is significant for DoD 
because AC units are often used to keep sensitive communications equipment cool at 
remote Forward Operating Bases (FOB).  PV power would reduce the amount of reliance 
on liquid fuel transportation to the site.  Trieb, Langni and Klai (1997) stated in an 
analysis of solar electricity generation, using different technologies, that for small and 
medium stand-alone applications, PV systems were the best choice.  
  In addition, Patel (2006) and Treib et al. (1997) suggest other major 
advantages of using PV power are: 
• Short lead times to design, install and start up a new plant. 
• Highly modular; hence, the plant economy is not strongly 
dependent on size. 
• Power output matches very well with peak-load demands. 
                                                 
2 Author’s calculation: 103M gallons x $13.68 (total ownership cost) = $1.4B. 
3 Another cost consideration that could be taken into account are the causalities service members 
sustain while conducting convoy operations and the medical care they would need.  If these costs are 
factored in, the total ownership cost of $1.4B will rise dramatically. 
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• Static structure, no moving parts; hence, no noise. 
• Longer life with little maintenance because of no moving parts. 
• Highly mobile and portable because of light weight. 
 
These advantages may offer DoD areas of opportunity where fossil fuels, or other 
renewable energy technologies cannot.  For example, in our current situation in 
Afghanistan, there are several FOBs throughout the country, which present logistical 
challenges for energy resupply.  With the dynamic operational environment we face 
because there are no frontlines, FOBs can change to a different location at a moment’s 
notice.  Because PV is highly modular and mobile, it offers an easy, flexible power 
source for those remote locations.  In addition, the silent operation of PV systems also 
can provide a unique opportunity for DoD to reduce its sound signature in remote 
locations, which can be key to maintaining a stealthy posture in hostile environments, 
especially in mountainous regions like Afghanistan where sound can be carried for quite 
a distance.   
Finally, one of the most critical advantages that a PV power system 
provides is that there is little to no cost associated with maintaining the unit because there 
are little to no moving parts4.  The effect of this is fairly significant on the supply chain 
both from an operational and a financial stand point.  This means that operational units 
that take portable PV power systems into a theater will not require the extensive spare 
parts inventory support that accompanies other power systems.  The direct effect on this 
is that operational units will not have to maintain inventories on site, thus allowing 
personnel to focus on the mission, rather than the maintenance of equipment. 
2. Planning/Budgeting Process (PPBE) 
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) System is the 
primary tool used for defense resource management.  PPBE’s main purpose is to 
articulate the strategy to support the President’s National Security Strategy and what 
                                                 
4 Some PV power systems have moving parts such as systems that track the sun.  These systems would 
require spare parts for motors.  Military planners should have the option to select their desired PV power 
system to meet their operation requirements. 
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force structure, equipment and personnel is required to support it.  The foundation for 
PPBE is the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).  This is a computerized data base 
with information on the force structure, personnel strength and financial picture of DoD 
which contains 11 years of data5.  If DoD is serious about the use of solar power and 
decides to make it a priority, it will have a positive impact on the PPBE process.   
a. Initial Costs and Long-Term Costs 
  Between 1980 and 2004, the capital cost of PV modules per watt of power 
capacity declined from more that $20 per watt to less than $4 per watt.  During that same 
period, the cost of energy declined from almost $1 to less than 20 cents per kWh (Patel, 
2006).  So how does solar power compare with other energy sources on a cost per kWh?  
Bradford (2006), collected data and compared electricity production costs across 
common renewable and conventional energy sources (Figure 8) and concluded that solar 
power was more expensive at base electrical load, but much more competitive at peak 
and intermediate electrical loads, due to the nature of costs associated with shutting down 
and starting up conventional generators to deal with load fluctuations. 
   
 
Figure 8.   Cost comparison in kWh [From: Bradford] 
 
 
                                                 
5 The FYDP is broken into the following 11 years: The prior year (1st); the current year (2nd); two 
budget years (3&4); four out years (5-8); three additional years of force structure and manpower (9-11). 
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These costs, represented by horizontal “bars” considers the total lifecycle 
operating and maintenance costs of electricity generation, and carries uncertainties and 
assumptions about financing methods, generator life span, and fuel costs.  However, 
Figure 9, the learning curve for solar power, shows a steep decline in cost projected into 
the future where it may eventually match the cheaper wind and biomass sources.   
 
Figure 9.   Renewable Energy Learning Curves [From: NREL]. 
 
This trend shows promise and is supported by the earlier remarks by the 
Prometheus Institute predicts that solar power costs will decrease 40 percent by 2010.  
Solar photovoltaic dramatic cost decrease has the potential to make it a solid contributor 
as one of the many instruments for DoD’s long-term energy strategy.  Could solar power 
surpass wind as a more cost effective energy source for DoD?  According to Parker 
(2008), BTM Consult APS, a Danish wind power consultant, reported that land-based 
rotors have incurred a price increase of 1.38 million euros (2.13 million USD) per 
megawatt hour after rising 74 percent in the past three years.  The high prices can be 
attributed to strong demand and the material costs increases mainly due to the increase in 
commodities that have pushed prices of steel, aluminum, and copper (Parker, 2008).  As 
the cost of oil continues to rise to above $135 per barrel, solar power perhaps can now 
become more of a key instrument in DoD’s energy portfolio for the future. 
b.  Solar vs. Wind: A Further Comparison 
In 2006, Detronics Limited, a company in Ontario, Canada conducted a 
study with an objective to determine if a wind energy system or photovoltaic solar system 
was more cost effective.  Detronics Limited used a Bergey XL.1 wind turbine system 
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with a factory rating of 1,000 watts at a wind speed of 24.5 mph.  The composite of the 
rest of the system was: a hub height at 100ft AGL; the tower was located 225ft from a 
1,500 ah battery bank; and was connected with #2 gauge copper cable that was buried 
(Detronics Limited, 2006).  For their PV system, they used 10 Shell SQ75 modules that 
were mounted on a fixed-axis, top post rack.  To convert the incoming higher voltage to a 
system of 24 volts, they used an Outback MX-60 charge controller that was also 
connected with buried #2 gauge copper cable (Detronics Limited, 2006). 
On an equipment comparison alone, wind was the cheaper option.  Their 
wind system had a cost of $7,015, and the solar PV system cost $9,181.00.  Two 
additional cost comparisons were conducted which were purchase cost vs. cost per rated 
watts and purchase cost vs. cost per produced kWh.  In both of these cost comparisons, 
wind held the advantage.  On a purchase cost vs. cost per rated watts, wind cost $7.02 
per rated watt, while on a purchase cost vs. cost per produced kWh, wind cost $7.35.  
Solar on the other hand, cost $12.24 per rated watt on a purchase cost vs. cost per rated 
watt but only cost $10.68 when compared using purchase cost vs. cost per produced 
kWh. 
Finally, Detronics Limited compared solar vs. wind using service life 
maintenance, seasonal and yearly variations, and design considerations.  Their conclusion 
was that wind held a slight advantage over solar but that if they are used together, they 
can be a very reliable energy combination.  In addition, they also acknowledged that solar 
can be more effective and cheaper than wind in certain niches.  Endurance Wind Power 
(EWP) Inc. also came to the same conclusion.  EWP stated in 2008, that the question 
should not be which renewable energy technology is better, but rather what is the most 
appropriate and affordable energy system for your location and application (niche or 
broad) (EWP, 2008). These conclusions from two independent organizations gives merit 
to our claim that solar power, while not yet the cheapest energy source, can still provide 
DoD more bang-for-the-buck in certain niches.  The specific niches are analyzed and 
presented in Chapter IV. 
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c. Understanding Cost Estimate Disparities in Solar Power 
Extensive research was conducted using government research agencies 
and companies involved in producing the same type PV systems in order to determine if 
there were any reports or data to suggest why there are disparities in cost per kilowatt 
hour6.  Unfortunately, no such data could be found however, as we will find out below, 
data can be manipulated very easily to leverage an advantage against a competitor. 
If the average person was presented with 10 different companies who 
make photovoltaic solar cells using the same technology, and each company only 
provided their cost per kilowatt hour, would the average person be able to make the 
decision as to which one is the best?  According to Newick (n.d.) in order to make this 
decision, a buyer would need to know three things.  First, is how much does the system 
cost including all rebates and tax credits?  Second, how much energy can the solar system 
generate (forecasting can provide an accurate estimate)?  Finally, what is the size of the 
system?  The formula to compute the cost per kilowatt hour in simplistic terms is: 
Investment / Energy * Size * Years.  For example, a system costing $25,000 with a yearly 
energy output of 2,000 kilowatt per hour (kWh), a system size of 3 kW, and a life span of 
30 years, costs $.14 cost per kWh as computed from the following: 
 $25,000 / 2,000 kWh * 3kW * 30 years = $.14 per kWh. 
So why are there cost disparities and disagreements in solar power and 
among all renewable technologies for that matter?  Let’s examine this referring to the 
equation above.  If any one number is changed, it changes the result.  Similar equations 
are used to determine the cost for other energy generation technologies but are beyond 
the scope of this report.  So, if two identical companies used the same data given above, 
but one company claimed that the life expectancy was 35 years instead of 30 years it 
results in a new cost per kilowatt hour of $.12 kWh.  In this instance, data manipulation, 
whether intentional or unintentional, can cause cost estimates to vary which can confuse a 
                                                 
6 The website http://www.enf.cn/database/panels-usa.html was used to locate 40 US companies that 
manufactured PV systems.  To make sure that the research was consistent, we examined only companies 
that used Amorphus panel technology.  Searching their websites resulted in no concrete data for cost per 
kilowatt hour.  The companies were vague and only noted their “low cost per kilowatt hour” technology.   
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decision maker or investor.  Also, it is helpful to consider the problem that arises in the 
investment portion of the equation.  Companies are continually looking to improve 
business practices and reduce costs, which could lead to a lower capital cost assumption 
on the investment side of the equation, and reduce the cost per kilowatt hour.   
The bottom line is that the only way to get consensus on renewable energy 
production costs is to ensure that the exact same variable values are used.  But due to 
diversity, biases, and preconceived notions it would be unlikely to get exactly the same 
result across all those who make the estimates.  This has certainly been a finding during 
the research for this report, with disagreement among energy enthusiasts about which 
renewable energy offers the “best” cost solution. 
D. SUMMARY 
Even though solar power is not yet the most cost effective or efficient on a large 
scale, solar power’s continued trend towards better efficiency and low cost are making it 
more attractive to become a significant factor in a long term DoD energy portfolio.  One 
of solar power’s strengths is its small supply chain which can make it very attractive for 
DoD, especially in remote operating environments like the ones we currently face in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  This small supply chain can help reduce the infrastructure costs 
associated with other traditional energy sources.  Finally, it appears the main reasons that 
there exist disparities in solar power cost computations is because of preconceived 
notions, biases and use of different variables in estimating costs. 
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IV. UNCERTAINTY AND DOD ROLE IN DIFFUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Fifty-eight years ago, in 1950, under the very real threat of global annihilation 
amid an intensifying American-Soviet cold war conflict, The Truman administration 
issued a key policy document, National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) which 
issued an urgent challenge to adopt an offensive strategy to defeat the Soviet Empire.  
American strategy, according to NSC-68, aimed to “induce a retraction of the Kremlin’s 
control and influence,” and to “foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system” 
(Sempa, 2004). NSC-68 was an important part of an overall shift in American foreign 
policy to a comprehensive containment strategy that was perpetuated to varying degrees 
by successive administrations, and eventually redefined into a more aggressive “we win, 
they lose” strategy by Ronald Reagan.  The containment strategy, and even more so, 
Reagan’s strategy was successful in exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union and 
bringing about its collapse in December 1991.   
President Truman and President Reagan gave the United States a vision of a 
future it could create.  From their strategies the U.S. Government, allied governments, 
academia, and industry worked together for fifty years to convert an unprecedented 
challenge into many small victories and eventually a total win.  Did the U.S. strategy 
against the Soviet Union remain the same throughout the half-century conflict?  It 
certainly did not; but this is not essential for long-term strategies.  Good strategies must 
be internally consistent but must also be adaptive to the changing environment and future 
uncertainties. 
The methodology for forming a long-term strategy requires considering the 
desired end state and stepping backward in time toward the present to identify the 
hierarchy of events that must be met to support subsequent achievements (Hornitschek, 
2006).  Before improved solar energy capabilities can be realized, certain technological 
challenges must be solved, i.e., storage, transmission, electricity output, etc., and before 
that, certain research and development institutions must be formed and resourced as well 
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as strategic partnerships with industry and academia.  In this manner, a series of 
milestones is identified to serve as short term wins, just as in the case of defeating the 
Soviet Union, or putting the first man on the moon.  Kotter (2007) states these short-term 
wins are essential for sustaining the transformation process.  In the context of creating a 
future all-solar and electric-powered military force, two basic strategies shall be 
considered: 
• Allow market forces and timing to create and deliver necessary technology 
diffusion and transformational capabilities with DoD taking a reactive role 
• DoD takes a proactive role in leading an energy transformation much as it 
did in the space race with NASA (Hornitschek, 2006), through 
diminishing solar technology uncertainty, impacting experience curve and 
scale effects, and driving diffusion of solar energy applications.  
With the unique acquisition lead times, government financing rates, long-term 
focus and logistics infrastructure of DoD, this chapter intends to defend the latter strategy 
by delving deeper into the characteristics of technology uncertainty, effects of 
complementary technologies, and DoD strategy options for driving diffusion of solar 
power.   
B. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION UNCERTAINTY 
1. Nature of Uncertainty 
In order for a powerful complex organization like DoD to positively influence 
diffusion and learning of a new technological innovation, it should understand the 
sources and effects of innovation uncertainty.  That is not to say that any organization has 
the ability to anticipate the full future impact of successful innovations.  Most technology 
forecasts fail because uncertainties stand in the way of full exploitation and the diffusion 
paths depend on so many uncontrollable factors.  There are endless cases throughout 
history where man has been unable, despite best attempts, to predict full development 
impact, even after technical feasibility of new inventions has been established.  The 
reason it’s difficult to foresee the uses of a new technology is that most major inventions 
originate in a very primitive form in an attempt to solve very specific and narrowly 
defined problems.  Often, its eventual use emerges to have major impacts in totally 
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unanticipated contexts (Rosenberg, 1996).  The steam engine, for example, was invented 
in the eighteenth century specifically for pumping water out of flooded mines.  It 
underwent improvements and later became essential as a source of power for textile 
factories and iron mills, then as a source of power for transportation, then on for 
generating electricity.  Similarly, Marconi’s radio invention satisfied the primary need for 
communicating between two points as in ship-to-ship or ship-to-shore, and not for 
broadcasting to wide public audiences (Rosenberg, 1996).  Patent lawyers at Bell Labs 
passed on a patent for their development of the laser because they thought it had no use in 
future relevance on the telephone industry.  Looking back, perhaps no other invention has 
had more impact on telecommunications, along with fiber-optics, than the laser 
(Rosenberg, 1995).  Rosenberg (1995) points out that about 80 percent of R&D 
expenditures are devoted to improving products that already exist, rather than inventing 
new ones.  A familiar example is the telephone, which has undergone incredible 
improvements during its hundred-year life, enhanced by going cordless, cellular, 
voicemail, and so on.  This paper suggests that DoD, along with commercial industry, 
devote R&D to multiple solar technology paths of improvement.  
2. Dimensions of Uncertainty 
Besides the basic question: “Will it work?” Rosenberg (1996) suggests that 
uncertainty is the product of several sources and that understanding the nature of these 
sources and the barriers to overcoming them goes to the heart of how new technologies 
are devised, how rapidly they diffuse, the extent of that diffusion, and the eventual impact 
on economic performance and welfare. 
a. Potential Uses 
First, when a new technology is developed, it is difficult for industry to 
fully identify all its potential uses and improvements.  Well before the development of 
the first official photovoltaic cell in 1954 (Bradford, 2006) by researchers at Bell Labs, 
the basic PV effect was first recorded in 1839 by Edmund Becquerel (Hubbard, 1989) 
and, like the first steam engine, no one could anticipate the future advances and 
applications that lay ahead.  Even in the 1950s and 1960s, PV cells were limited to 
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applications in U.S. satellites and spacecraft.  It was not until the oil crisis in 1973 that 
terrestrial uses of PV were considered and technological efficiency took off.  The jump 
from niche applications in the 1960s to broad applications in the 1970s and decades 
afterwards set the stage for accelerated diffusion, but there’s a considerable way to go.  
Newer solar technologies like solar thermal and thin film carry the same unanticipated 
future applications and improvements. 
b. Complementary Innovations 
A second dimension of uncertainty comes not from the technology as 
mentioned above but from improvements that take place in complementary technologies.  
One notion is that the creation of invention A increases demand for invention B.  On the 
other hand, the creation of invention A can also kill off invention B.  Sometimes, the 
success of invention A depends on invention B, and invention B does not exist yet.  This 
complex relationship is overly simplified of course.  Rosenberg (1995) suggests that 
technological systems should be thought of as comprised of clusters of complementary 
inventions and that performance improvements in one part are of only limited 
significance without simultaneous improvements in other parts.  Bell Labs would have 
had to anticipate the future invention of fiber-optic technology to see the relevance of the 
laser in the telephone industry.   
It is not uncommon for the invention of a new technology (invention A) in 
a highly competitive society to lead to an accelerated improvement of an older 
technology (invention b) (Rosenberg, 1995).  For example, in the 1940s, predictions of 
future applications of computers were very pessimistic.  They filled an entire room and 
contained thousands of electron tubes, just to perform basic mathematical functions.  
When transistors and then integrated circuits were invented, they turned out to be 
catalysts for enormous growth and applicability of the computer industry, beyond which 
no one had previously imagined.   
Sometimes, complementary technologies may be exactly what are needed 
to spawn an entirely new system as in the case of the electric automobile.  Regenerative 
breaking, flywheel technology, and battery development are among the many distinct 
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complementary technologies that are traveling unique paths of uncertain development 
and applicability.  However, they have all progressed far enough to become integrated 
into a system that may likely have a promising future.  Rosenberg (1995) cites a brilliant 
example in which Sony’s development of the Walkman used existing technological 
capabilities (involving batteries, magnetic tapes, and earphones) to combine into an 
entirely new product that could provide entertainment in a way no one had previously 
thought of.   
It is important to note that innovation of systems can only progress as fast 
as the slowest developing complementary technology.  Arguably, the weakest 
complementary technology in the electric car “cluster” is the rechargeable battery pack 
and its ability to quickly charge and store enough energy to be practical and cost efficient.  
Giant leaps have been made over the past decade however and the 2008 Tesla Roadster, 
now in production at the time of this writing, is making headlines across all media 
channels.     
It is also conceivable that old technologies awaiting complementary 
inventions will become substituted by the new technology, even when predictions for the 
original technology pointed to enormous promise.  Rosenberg (1996) illustrates that 
communications satellites unexpectedly declined during the 1980s with the introduction 
of fiber optics and the huge and reliable expansion of bandwidth capacity that they 
brought with them. 
To summarize, the simultaneous advancements in old and new 
technologies, along with the dynamics of substitutes and complements creates 
challenging barriers that prevents decision makers from understanding the total effect of 
uncertainty on technological innovation.  For the DoD in particular, this environment 
requires considerable analysis and sequential decision making approaches in order to 
minimize risk and costly failures associated with renewable energy development and 
diffusion. 
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c. Value and Economic Feasibility 
In order for market forces to create and deliver necessary technology and 
diffusion of technologies, there must be certain human needs met.  If the technology 
doesn’t save time, save money, or add value anywhere along the value chain, it will be 
very difficult to realize a promising future without external intervention such as 
subsidies, taxation of substitutes, or others.  Moreover, systems must be economically 
feasible.  The Concorde supersonic jetliner was a marvelous success technologically, but 
was a financial disaster costing British and French taxpayers billions of dollars 
(Rosenberg, 1995).  As solar energy technology becomes more competitive with fossil 
fuel prices, and as diffusion drives down capital costs, its value and economic feasibility 
will likely improve and become more relevant to the research community and society. 
3. Uncertainty and Decision Making 
In the private sector, researchers are expected to spend their research and 
development funds on pathways they hope will turn out relevant economically and 
socially.  Thus, market forces encourage exploration across a wide array of alterative 
paths.  It is essential, especially in the early stages when uncertainty is high, to diversify 
in this manner and take limited sequential approaches to decision making (Rosenberg, 
1996).  The enormous risk of failure demands this approach, or else premature 
commitment ensues and likely leads to failure.  It would be difficult to find a better 
illustration of survival in an environment of immense uncertainty than in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Drug makers are required to thrive with 99 percent failure rates, 
pursuing thousands of sequential pathways, just to find one successful drug that makes it 
to market.  Statistics show that it takes an average of 12 years for an experimental drug to 
travel from the lab to the consumer, and that just a little over one percent of all 
experimental drugs make it to human testing.  Of that total, only 20 percent get actual 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval (Lipsky & Sharp, 2001).  The point is the 
pharmaceutical industry has learned to deal with this uncertainty and get products out to 
consumers.  It could be argued that if uncertainty in the pharmaceutical industry was 
mitigated somehow, perhaps failure rates would drop along with cost to the consumer.  
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The same holds true in the solar energy field.  As it matures, market forces will spawn 
increasing imitators and diffusers and reduce uncertainty and indecision. 
Government organizations like DoD are not quite on the same level of playing 
field as private industry when it comes to dealing with technology uncertainty.  The 
tremendous lead times to adjust force structure, systems and doctrine may prevent DoD 
from waiting for market forces to shape an energy future.  While DoD is waiting, it is 
absorbing more and more risk that petroleum supplies will become a critical concern and 
national security will be compromised.  Additionally, U.S. government agencies like 
DoD have historically been able to absorb more uncertainty risk and champion or 
concentrate focus on narrow fields of technology, neglecting alternatives, as opposed to 
taking a cautious, more diversified sequential approach that private industry practices.  
These wasteful premature commitments have led to poor decisions and poor financial 
efficiency.  The U.S. government’s post-war energy policy was not wrong simply 
because it made a major commitment to nuclear power that subsequently turned out to be 
problem ridden, but because it was so single-minded and neglected many alternatives, 
including improvements in efficiency as well as new energy sources (Rosenberg, 1995).  
There are ongoing debates regarding the state of the current DoD Joint Strike Fighter and 
Littoral Combat Ship programs on whether DoD neglected alternatives, and rushed to 
decisions that are now creating enormous cost overruns, schedule slips and threats of 
program cancellation (in the case of LCS).  To deal with the uncertainty of solar energy 
technology, and all renewable energy technology as a whole, DoD should learn from the 
private firms and resist temptation to champion any one technological alternative and 
manage a more diversified research and development portfolio with a broad range of 
alternatives in case social or economic priorities change.  
C. TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION 
Diffusion is the process by which technology is dispersed throughout society and 
adapted for widespread use (Sawin, 2001).  According to U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), it takes on average 15 to 20 years for major technologies 
to be diffused throughout the economy.  However, the GAO studies also revealed that the 
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current technology used for generating electricity took more than 50 years to diffuse due 
to inertia and infrastructure of old systems.  The literature on diffusion depicts the classic 
“S” shaped curve below in Figure 10.   
 
 
Figure 10.   Diffusion of Technology Curve [After: Rosenberg]. 
 
When a technology is first introduced, it requires considerable effort and funding 
to break into the market.  This phase is characterized by a great deal of risk during much 
research, development, and experimentation.  If barriers are overcome, a technology will 
enter a phase of accelerated growth in which viability and usefulness of the technology 
has been established, standardization increases, and prices drop due to economies of 
scale.  Finally, a technology will enter a phase in which improvements face diminishing 
returns and market saturation sets in.  In this maturity phase, competition is based more 
on cost reduction rather than design improvements.  What is not illustrated is a post-
maturity phase in which a technology declines.  This occurs due to obsolescence caused 
by substitution, or changes in economic or social priorities. 
A key reason for slow diffusion of technologies as discovered in the GAO report 
is that basic technological problems have to be resolved before society embraces them 
(Goldfarb, 2005).  To support this argument, it is helpful to examine a case involving 
urban transit, in particular, the electric street railway system.  When the electric transit 
technology was introduced in the 1830s, its adoption was inhibited by a key technological 
barrier – electricity was supplied by messy liquid filled batteries.  For forty years, 
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experimentation continued with little progress until a complementary technology came 
along.  Known as the dynamo, an electric generator that converted rotational energy into 
direct current (DC) electricity was invented in the late 1870s (Goldfarb, 2005).  By this 
time, electric driven transportation was looking more and more attractive due to a 
diseased ravaged horse population in the eastern U.S.; noise, pollution and safety issues 
associated with steam street cars; and the costliness of cable cars (when cables were 
under the street).  However, according to Goldfarb (2005), there were three distinct 
challenges: distributing electric power from a generator to a moving vehicle, designing a 
motor that could function under varying loads without severe sparking and brush wear, 
and devising a method to transfer the power from the motor to the wheels.  At this point, 
the electric street car was in the “introduction” phase of diffusion.  Over the course of the 
1880s, a series of ventures of various entrepreneurial inventors found solutions to all 
three problems and the electric rail car entered a phase of dramatic market growth.  From 
1880 to 1903, the total length of street electric railways increased thirty-fold from 1,000 
miles to 30,000 miles (Goldfarb, 2005). 
There are countless instances throughout history similar to the electric streetcar 
case where social and economic factors played a large role in the rate of diffusion of new 
technological innovations.  Before discussing what policies and actions an organization 
like DoD can champion in order to speed the rate of diffusion of solar energy technology, 
it is important to introduce the popular diffusion frameworks contained in the diffusion 
literature.  The diffusion framework is a complex one of several sub-theories or concepts 
that provide insight into human and social nature, including how new information is 
accepted (or not accepted) by potential users.  Sub-theories of the classic diffusion 
framework include the innovation-decision theory, the individual innovativeness theory, 
the theory of rate of adoption, and the theory of perceived attributes (Rogers, 2003).  
Only the theory of perceived attributes will be discussed in this report because it is the 
most relevant to adoption of technology by society, and not to the practice of individuals. 
1. Theory of Perceived Attributes 
According to Rogers (2003), the theory of perceived attributes focuses on how the 
technology participant views characteristics of the practice and actions under 
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investigation.  These affect the rate of diffusion and have been typically characterized as 
those that relate to complexity, compatibility, relative advantage, observability, and 
trialability.  Complexity refers to the degree of difficulty of understanding and 
implementing the technology from the perspective of a potential adopter.  Compatibility 
relates to the degree to which the practice is compatible to current objectives and 
philosophies of society.  Compatibility factors can be values or something as simple as 
not having the right resources (land, financing) to implement the practice.  Relative 
advantage concerns itself with the possibility of increased savings, reduced cost, or other 
economic and social factors that make adoption more advantageous over other 
alternatives, including doing nothing.  Observability speaks to the visibility of results of 
the implemented practice.  Some practices are obviously more observable than others 
(cleaner air, reduced environmental noise, and construction of solar facilities vs. 
preparing a conservation plan, for example) and therefore might be adopted more 
quickly.  Finally, trialability deals with the potential to experiment with the technology  
on a smaller, less extensive scale.  The hopeful outcome is that a potential adopter can 
implement the new practice on a trial basis and then modify it further to meet specific 
needs.  In general, diffusion can be driven by a top down approach from the experts to 
users, or a centralized approach where wide sharing of power and control among clients 
is practiced (Sawin, 2001). 
2. DoD Options for Driving Diffusion 
Sawin (2001), suggests that industrial and financial sectors are short-term focused 
and that private firms will not invest in large volumes of commercially available 
renewable energy technologies at the current prices and levels of risk.  Driving diffusion 
of solar energy technology will have a positive influence on the attributes mentioned 
above and on costs and economies of scale.  Driving diffusion also stimulates the 
“learning” or “experience curve” of new technologies.  Learning theory simply states that 
as cumulative production of a technology doubles, its cost declines by a constant 
percentage.  This percentage has been termed “progress ratio” or “slope of the learning 
curve” by the literature (Poponi, 2003).  There have been numerous studies conducted on 
the historical learning curve slope for solar PV technology.  Poponi (2003) compares 
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several studies conducted by researchers and confirms with his own analysis that the 
slope of learning for PV technology from 1976 to 2002 has been on an 80 percent trend.  
This indicates that costs have reduced by 20 percent at every doubling of cumulative 
production.  Thus, the aim should be to drive diffusion such that learning curve slope 
trends away from 80 percent to something smaller.  Driving diffusion and stimulating 
learning can be accomplished by contributing to both the supply and demand sides of the 
solar energy market. 
a. Instruments to Develop Solar Energy Technology: Supply Push 
Supply-side options include R&D policies devoted to improving the 
reliability, durability, and efficiency of a technology, and to reducing its cost (Sawin, 
2001).  R&D programs foster the creation of new technologies that can create positive 
impacts over the long term.  Since DoD is not in a position to directly manufacture solar 
energy equipment, the logical approach is to increasingly channel resources into solar 
energy R&D, not just for PV, solar thermal, thin film PV, etc., but for essential 
complementary technologies such as batteries, microturbines and thermal storage.  In 
general, only large industries and governments have the resources and interest to conduct 
R&D (Watson, et al., 1996).  DoD research agencies like DARPA, and Army CERL are 
already contributing essential R&D to the field of Solar Energy.   
Research and Development activities fall into three broad categories: basic 
research, designed to advance scientific knowledge of an energy technology; 
development of new technologies and new energy sources for commercial application; 
and improvement of existing technologies (Sawin, 2001).  The intention is for these 
activities to support R&D that the private sector would not undertake.  The returns from 
learning and R&D are uncertain, and risks are high but the results can be potentially large 
(Rosenberg, 1996), therefore the best strategy is to make gradual cautious investments 
and to pursue gradual technological experimentation.  Similarly, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted that “…it is important to have a government 
strategy that does not attempt to pick individual technology winners.”  This is why again 
this report recognizes the merits of wind and geothermal energy and growth and 
development in those fields.  These technologies should remain as part of a diversified 
 58
DoD energy portfolio, and efforts should also be diversified across a portfolio of specific 
technologies and niche applications within the solar energy field itself. 
Watanabe (1995) found that government R&D stimulates industrial R&D, 
thereby increasing what he termed "technology knowledge stock.”  This knowledge stock 
leads to cost and performance improvements, which stimulate demand, increasing size of 
niche markets which lead to economies of scale.  This also increases learning possibilities 
and therefore further cost reductions, which in turn feed back as further stimuli for 
industrial R&D and technology improvements.  His study also found that there is a time 
lag between R&D expenditures and returns (improved technology performance and lower 
costs) of less than 3 years.  
Since DoD would likely conduct R&D in areas that the public sector likely 
would not risk, a method should be considered to join the R&D findings and 
accomplishments of DoD and the private sector.  Sawin, (2001) suggests that such public 
R&D must be done in cooperation with the private sector, and that “it seldom makes 
sense to support research and development with public funds to the point of commercial 
readiness and then attempt to transfer the technology to a commercial developer.  The 
organizational learning involved in research and development is difficult to transfer.  It is 
far better to develop technologies in collaborative efforts involving research institutions, 
private equipment developers, and potential users, thereby promoting learning 
simultaneously in the laboratory, factory, and field.”  Referring back to the theory of 
perceived attributes, increased R&D in partnership with private sector leaders, may 
contribute significantly to reduced complexity of solar technology, greater understanding 
and compatibility, and greater relative advantage. 
b. Policies to Diffuse Solar Energy Technology: Demand Pull 
Demand side options complement supply side and further contribute to 
diffusion.  There are many more options for DoD to affect market demand than supply.  
There seems to be three schools of thought about the types of demand policies that are 
most effective in advancing new energy technologies.  One focuses on regulations, one 
on subsidies, and the third believes that both are essential (Sawin, 2001).   
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So which types of demand side policies are most effective?  According to 
the EIA, “It is regulation and not subsidization that has the greatest impact on energy 
markets.”  Also, while regulation burdens some producers or consumers with costs, it 
provides benefits to others and does not require government funding due to loss of 
revenue (EIA, 1992).  In contrast, the California Energy Commission (CEC) argues that 
regulations, collaborative programs and other low-cost activities that address market 
barriers are not as effective as subsidization in the form of high-cost tax incentives and 
standard offer contracts in accelerating the market adoption of new technologies.  This is 
because the latter policy types “create an early large market for consumers which can 
create production economies to further reduce costs.”  The CEC report goes on to state 
that “These successful activities are an important reason why California is now the 
world's leader in energy technology development (California Energy Commission [CEC], 
1996).”  Although subsidies are generally effective in the short term, they are not 
effective long term solutions for some programs.   If a subsidy is very large, it can create 
an industry that is costly and highly dependent upon that subsidy.  Subsidies can attract 
entrepreneurs who have short-term interest in the subsidized industry, and who make 
minimal investment and buy out as much of the inputs as possible, reducing ultimate 
quality (Sawin, 2001). 
Whether its subsidization or regulation or both that is most effective, DoD 
is not in a position to issue subsidies or tax incentives to itself or the public, however, in 
essence DoD is able to indirectly subsidize the solar technology industry by driving 
diffusion via four powerful pathways: Goal setting, solar resource studies, government 
purchase contracts, and education and information. 
The federal government set one of its first renewable energy goals with the 
passing of executive order 13123 in June, 1999.  Section 204 of the order states that 
“each agency shall strive to expand the use of renewable energy within its facilities and 
in its activities by implementing renewable energy projects, and by purchasing electricity 
from renewable energy sources.”  Six years later, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 set more 
specific federal goals for renewable energy adoption calling for three percent of energy 
purchases from renewable sources during 2007 to 2009, five percent from 2010 to 2012, 
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and 7.5 percent from 2013 and beyond.  Hoping to become a key proving ground, the 
DoD followed this up with a more aggressive goal of 25 percent renewable energy use or 
purchase by the year 2025 (Hornitschek, 2006).  Figure 11 shows the progress DoD 
reported to congress in 2005.  The trend indicates that they are on target to meet or 
exceed this goal and a recommendation might be to adjust the goal higher to something 
more difficult to attain, such as 30 percent by 2025, or to implement solar energy systems 
across all 5,300 DoD sites.  It would cement DoD’s leadership in the renewable energy 
landscape. 
 
Figure 11.   DoD Renewable Energy Progress Since 2000 [From: DUSD(I&E)].  
 
This leads to the next strategy DoD might want to consider or improve 
upon, and that is Solar resource studies.  DoD should partner with universities and 
scientific organizations to create siting maps to delineate the best solar areas in the U.S. 
and abroad against current and future military installations.  These solar energy 
production maps should be made publically available and shared with other research 
firms and technology producers.  There are many siting maps in existence today already, 
but the new studies could verify and improve on those already performed, using the latest  
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efficiency attributes of cutting edge solar energy systems of today and tomorrow.  It will 
become a vital preliminary step in preparing to implement solar energy applications 
across all DoD sites.  
Purchasing strategies will likely become the most powerful driver for DoD 
to push diffusion and drive adoption along the “S” curve.  This strategy can be executed 
in several different ways.  For example, DoD could dedicate resources to up-and-coming 
speculative technologies like the latest generation thin film applications, or toward 
mature solar technologies like solar hot water heating or photovoltaic cells.  Purchases 
and investments in new, immature technologies may have the tendency to benefit the 
survivability and acceptability of the technologies and the companies producing them.  
Economically speaking, this can be an important driver for healthy competitiveness and 
innovation under strong demand.  Today, DoD faces a shrinking industrial base of 
contractors with the capabilities necessary to field major shipbuilding and weapons 
system projects.  One can argue that this shrinkage may have something to do with the 
fact that the largest DoD procurement contracts often go to tried-and-true companies like 
Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics and not so much to less mature, untested 
companies. 
Another way DoD purchases can be broadly characterized is whether it’s 
applied niche by niche, or installation by installation. For example, by going niche by 
niche, DoD can set out to place grid-connected PV modules on all rooftops, thereby 
driving this particular niche into greater adoption through it’s diffusion, then move on to 
another niche such as installing off-grid solar thermal systems with microturbines.  Or, by 
going from installation to installation, DoD can utilize the best of all solar technologies 
depending on siting characteristics, installation needs, agreements with utilities, etc.  
Each strategy has its merits and implementing systems nice by niche would likely 
enhance the perceived attributes of observability and relative advantage more quickly 
than going installation by installation.  On the contrary, moving from installation to 
installation and employing a variety of solar technologies based on the best fit, would 
likely reduce the perceived attribute of complexity and increase the trialability attribute. 
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According to the office of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Installations and Environment, DoD currently owns 2.4 billion square feet of real 
property, over 343,000 buildings, and 32 million acres of land.  Placing rooftop PV cells 
on 343,000 buildings would make an enormous impact on the demand market for solar 
cells and drive down cost while driving up adoption. 
There is a way to put this impact in perspective.  Using a conservative 
estimate for PV electricity generation of 10 watts per square foot (EERE, 2007), 8 hours 
of daily sunshine, and an assumption that 50 percent of DoD’s rooftops could accept PV 
panels, approximately 120 trillion British Thermal Units (BTU) of electricity would be 
produced in one year.  According to EIA (2006), the total solar/PV energy produced in 
the U.S. in 2006 was 100 trillion BTU.  The conclusion is that PV arrays covering half of 
the rooftops owned by DoD would match all of the other PV energy generated in the U.S. 
over the same time period.  An even more shocking comparison results from a solar 
thermal energy analysis.  If only 10 percent of the land owned by DoD were covered with 
solar thermal energy plants, under the conservative estimates of 3.6 acres per MW 
(EERE, 2007) and 8 hours of daily sunlight, 8 quadrillion BTU of energy would be 
produced in one year.  The total of all renewable energy produced in the U.S. (solar, 
wind, geothermal, hydroelectric, biofuels, etc.) in 2006 was 6.9 quadrillion BTU (EIA, 
2006).  
Historically, DoD has benefited more from wind energy production than 
solar when considering the number of projects completed and the energy output realized.  
However, it is interesting that there have been many more solar projects fielded by the 
Department overall.  Despite this, wind energy generation and solar energy generation in  
DoD was nearly equal at 11,000 MWh in 2007. (DoD, 2008).  Table 1 below illustrates 
an upward trend in the number of solar and wind projects in DoD from 2003 to 2007.  
The fact that the average MWh per project for wind was approximately 5 to 10 times 
higher than the average MWh produced per solar project indicates that wind has been 
reserved for larger energy applications, and solar for smaller, niche applications. 
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Solar 27 76 87 106 77
Wind 2 2 8 10 12
Solar 3220 8855 6638 8689 11666
Wind 1123 1205 8592 15810 11358
Solar 119 117 76 82 152
Wind 562 603 1074 1581 947
Number of DoD Solar & Wind Projects
Total MWH for DoD Solar & Wind Projects 
Average MWH per DoD Solar & Wind Project
 
Table 1.   Annual DoD Wind and Solar Projects Density [After: DoD]. 
 
Figure 12 represents the same data in graphical form, showing solar and 
wind projects in DoD increasing since 2003, and the difference in the number of projects 
overall for both.  Figure 13 illustrates the “energy production density” for wind and solar 
as mentioned above.  Again, this confirms the intuitive reasoning that DoD is using wind 
energy for large production and solar for niche applications generally. 






















Figure 12.   DoD Solar and Wind Projects in Operation Each FY [After: DoD]. 
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Figure 13.   Density of Solar and Wind Generated per Project [After: DoD]. 
 
Further study of solar project trends and activities in DoD also produced a 
list of a number of prevalent niche applications that have proven successful and cost 
effective for DoD.  Table 2 shows these most common niche applications already in use 
as well as speculative future thin film applications likely to be deployed as the technology 
matures (except for thin film shingles which are already in use on a few DoD buildings).  
It is the recommendation of this report that thin film niche applications such as these be 
tested and assessed in the field in the near future.  Additionally, solar thermal energy is 
another application that has not yet been employed by DoD, and is listed in the table as a 
recommendation for future consideration.  Overall, Table 2 represents a diversified 
portfolio of solar niche applications that have been beneficial to date or are expected to 
be beneficial in the near future. 
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Technology Niche Application 
Solar Walls (Trombe Wall) Buildings, Hangars & Barracks 
Solar Domestic Hot Water Heating Buildings, Housing & Barracks 
Solar Domestic Hot Water Heating Swimming Pool Heaters 
Photovoltaics Rooftop Electricity Generation    
Photovoltaics Air Traffic Control Towers 
Photovoltaics Terrestrial Power Plants 
Photovoltaics Airstrip Lighting 
Photovoltaics General Exterior Lighting 
Photovoltaics Range Markers & Targets 
Photovoltaics Traffic Lights 
Photovoltaics Windsock Illumination 
Photovoltaics Outdoor Security & Warning System 
Photovoltaics Refrigeration and Cooling 
Photovoltaics Remote Alarms & Indicators 
Photovoltaics Remote Radio Equipment 
Photovoltaics Remote Water Pumping Stations 
Photovoltaics Satellites 
Photovoltaics Space Heating 
Photovoltaics Weather Data Equipment 
Solar Thin Film Automobiles 
Solar Thin Film Backpacks & Sacks 
Solar Thin Film Battery Chargers 
Solar Thin Film Cell Phones 
Solar Thin Film Notebook Computers 
Solar Thin Film Roofing Shingles 
Solar Thin Film Tent Material 
Solar Thin Film Tinted Windows 
Solar Thin Film Uniforms 
Solar Thermal Energy Terrestrial Power Plant 
Solar Thermal Energy Solar Cookers 
Table 2.    
Table 3.   DoD Proposed and Existing Solar Niche Applications [After: DoD]. 
 
When considering purchasing strategies among a portfolio of niche solar 
applications, several factors should be weighed including mobility and deployability of 
the equipment, production efficiency (energy produced per amount of material used), 
production capability (ability to support very large demand applications), and cost 
efficiency.  Certainly other characteristics can be included for analysis but for the sake of 
qualitatively assigning value to each solar technology, this will suffice.  Figure 14 
represents each technology’s relative value in relation to each other.  For example, solar 
thermal energy is more cost efficient than PV, but is much more difficult to mobilize and 
deploy in the battlefield. 
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Figure 14.   Solar Technology Niche Value Constellation 
 
The most important reason this project argues why DoD can be a 
substantial trend setter in this industry is the contracting power it has.  All federal 
agencies have the options of using financed contracts or funded contracts, or both.  
Legislation enacted in 1992 created Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPC), 
which are contracting vehicles that allow agencies to fund energy projects without up 
front capital costs and without special congressional appropriations (EERE, 2007).  
ESPCs are awarded by DOE and are financed contracts in partnership with energy 
service companies (ESCO) who arrange financing and guarantee that the improvements 
will generate savings sufficient to pay for the project over the term of the contract.  Later 
enacted in 1998, new legislation created an even easier method to finance capital costs of 
renewable energy projects.  Known as Super ESPCs, these indefinite-delivery, indefinite-
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develop a project (EERE, 2007).  Figure 15 below depicts DoD’s use of ESPC contracts 




Figure 15.   ESPC Contract Award Values for DoD [From: EERE]. 
 
Another financing mechanism available to DoD and other Federal 
agencies is the Utility Energy Services Contract (UESC).  UESCs are partnerships with 
franchised utilities.  Under this contract, utility companies typically provide financing to 
cover capital costs, the utility company is then repaid over the contract term from the 
energy cost savings (EERE, 2007). 
Finally, a funded contract vehicle is available to DoD.  The Energy 
Conservation Investment Program (ECIP) is a subset of the military construction 
(MILCON) program specifically designated for projects that save money on energy costs.  
It is an Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) centrally controlled funding allocation that 
is released on a case-by-case basis (OSD, 1993). 
The fourth important strategy that can strengthen the solar industry and 
improve its credibility is education and information dissemination.  Since it is such a new 
industry, the need for performance reports and other technological information is 
paramount.  If DoD established a reporting system to independently document electricity 
produced by solar energy at its bases for sharing with other bases, federal agencies, and 
 68
private industry, it would likely grow market attention and foster increased learning.  The 
information and lessons learned can be shared with complementary technology 
developers like turbine and battery manufacturers for instance to educate them on the 
needs of the field and foster healthy competition.  Work in this area can also go a long 
way in changing the negative image of solar roofs by educating potential adopters about 
aesthetically pleasing materials and configurations. The DoD annual energy reports to 
DOE are a fair starting point, but much improvement is needed.  There have been 
inconsistencies from year to year in reporting format, data inclusion, and span of 
reporting coverage. 
A competition that awards cash prizes for best solar powered vehicle or 
other solar demonstrations would be one particular education and information campaign.  
The DARPA grand challenges of 2004, 2005 and 2007 for example drew strong 
competitive spirit from leading universities and research institutions along with 
substantial media coverage and cash prizes. 
D. SUMMARY 
The market will not necessarily fund all innovative technologies simply because 
they are good ideas.  Synergies between defense and civil research are vital to assisting 
the market in diffusing the good ideas.  Just as DoD-funded projects like Arpanet, nuclear 
propulsion and the global positioning system set early standards that gave the commercial 
sector the framework upon which to create exponential market developments, so too 
could the early establishment of new energy infrastructure standards (production, 
transmission, connectivity, and modularity) prove to be the DoD’s greatest contribution 
to America’s long term energy strategy. 
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V. OTHER ISSUES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
DoD alone will not be able to stave off the impending energy crisis that our nation 
likely will face in the coming years.  As the current price trends increase for oil and other 
fossil fuel products, it will become more difficult for DoD to operate within its budget.  
Securing DoD’s energy sources should remain a top priority within DoD’s leadership.  In 
order to reach a goal of energy independence, DoD should perhaps begin to look at 
different ways in which they can achieve that goal.  Because the acquisition process is a 
fairly long process, it is recommended that DoD begin to create alliances with emerging 
solar power companies and universities to conduct research and examine the full potential 
of solar power for use within DoD. 
A strategic alliance is a partnership in which two or more firms combine 
resources and capabilities with the goal of establishing a mutual competitive advantage 
(Carpenter & Sanders, 2007).  Why should DoD form strategic alliances with companies, 
universities and possibly other governments who are interested in the benefits of solar 
power?  How can this benefit DoD in the near future and in the long-term?  What are the 
challenges DoD will face in managing this network of alliances?  These are important 
questions to ask because as the energy demand and cost continues to increase and we 
reach the peak of fossil fuel production, it will be important for DoD to make a thorough 
analysis of the benefits that solar power can provide.  This chapter examines two 
potential strategies that perhaps, DoD might consider for the successful management of 
its networking structure and the methods on improving the management of Research and 
Development.  Finally, the challenges that DoD might face if they adopt these strategies 
are discussed. 
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B. NETWORKING AND ALLIANCES 
1. Introduction 
In today’s rapidly changing environment, networking can provide a way to 
enhance product development, increase market share and maintain a competitive 
advantage over adversaries.  Alliances have been frequently used as a strategic 
instrument because they provide quick and flexible access to external sources (Hoffmann, 
2005).  The question should be asked is, “Why should DoD form a network of alliances 
for solar power?”  Networks enable forums for discussion, direct attention to new 
practices and facilitate the transmission of information (Goerzen, 2005).  Clearly DoD 
cannot become a one stop shop for solar power research, development and 
implementation.  Nor should they completely outsource these functions as well.  One way 
DoD might be able to successfully manage the development of solar power is through the 
process of networking.  DoD, in this case will be the “visible hand” that will help guide 
and nurture this network to bring the best products it can to its end users, the boots on the 
ground.    
2. Strategies for Successful Networking 
a. Cluster Building 
There are many ways DoD can create and manage an effective network of 
solar companies and universities.  One such way is to create a cluster.  A cluster should 
include supplier firms, university researchers, economic development practitioners, 
consultants and any other individual or entity form industry, academia or the regional 
community who have the skills, expertise or resources that are of value to the industry 
(Carroll, Reid, & Smith, 2007).  A benefit from forming a cluster is that synthesizes key 
actors in industry, the community and academia in order to achieve a well-rounded 
network (Figure 16). 
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Figure 16.   Cluster Partners [After: Reid, Carroll & Smith]. 
 
 
According to Carroll et al., in order for DoD to successfully build a cluster 
it must meet five key milestones which are comprised of individual steps (Figure 17).  
The first milestone involves defining the industry, defining the region and inventorying 
potential cluster members (PCM).  A PCM is defined as an individual or an organization 
that has the potential to contribute to the cluster and who, through that contribution, can 
provide value to the cluster initiative (Carroll et al., 2007).  Defining the industry for 
DoD is simple: solar power.  However, defining the region and potential cluster members 
maybe a little more difficult for DoD.  In all likelihood, it seems reasonable to consider 
that DoD would choose companies and universities located in the southwest because that 
is where solar power has the most potential.  Once these steps are completed, the next 
milestone is to conduct three analyses of the supply chain, social network and SWOT 
respectively.  These three analyses provide the base for identifying the key industries, key 
individuals and the key opportunities and challenges that the DoD would face in forming 
a solar industry cluster.  As Carroll et al. (2007) suggests, a Cluster Strategy Team (CST) 
would emerge which would compromise roughly between 10-12 people and be a diverse 
cross-section of academia, industry professionals, DoD personnel and the community.  
Finally, to complete this process a program manager and champion would be selected.  A 
program manager would supervise the day-to-day operations while the champion would 





Figure 17.   Key Steps in Forming an Industrial Cluster [After: Carroll, Reid, & 
Smith]. 
 
This model suggests that selecting a DoD member as a champion would 
be the best way for DoD to maintain an overall big picture of the network, and would act 
as moderator on tough issues that the program manager needed assistance on.   
b. Triangular Portfolio Management 
Another method that DoD could implement to managing a network of 
solar power alliances is through using a triangular portfolio management system.  As 
Hoffmann (2005) suggests there are four tasks in which a triangular portfolio 
management systems is created: portfolio strategy, portfolio monitoring, portfolio co-





Figure 18.   Alliance Portfolio Management [From: Hoffman]. 
 
The first thing DoD could do is create the portfolio strategy which is 
comprised of two underlying core sub-sections: alliance policy and alliance strategy.  
Alliance policy’s objective is to strategically align the alliance activities with the 
network’s strategy and values, while the objective for the alliance policy is to determine 
the strategic orientation and goals of all alliances of the business unit and the 
configuration of the business alliance portfolio (Hoffmann, 2005).  This is where DoD 
can dictate how the network for solar power should work, what are the goals it intends to 
achieve, and how it intends to reach those goals.  Creating the portfolio strategy first will 
help lay the foundation for the rest of the process in creating a successful network. 
The second step DoD could perform is to create the portfolio co-
ordination.  This segment is very important because it will help delineate how DoD will 
utilize the network’s synergy and help avoid potential conflicts within the network.  
Ideally, DoD should work with potential organizations that have a possibility of being 
accepted into the network or firms that have signed on to be key instruments in the 
network’s future development and planning.  In order for DoD to effectively utilize the 
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synergies in the network, the network itself must be able to transfer information and 
resources from one firm to another which will allow economies of scope; and mutual 
specialization allows economies of scale (Hoffmann, 2005). 
The third piece of the triangle is portfolio monitoring.  The goal of 
portfolio monitoring is to develop and nurture the performance of the network and allows 
management (DoD) to intervene if performance fails to live up to the expectations 
(Hoffmann, 2005).  One way DoD could potentially form a monitoring group is to make 
sure that it represents a cross section of the firms involved, headed by a DoD 
representative, which could review the network’s ability to communicate, work together 
and achieve the desired goals set forth by the alliance strategy.   
Finally, in order to complete the triangular portfolio network, the alliance 
management systems must be created.  The alliance management system provides the 
infrastructures such as standardized tools and formalized processes as well as specialized 
roles and positions that support the tasks of managing individual alliances as well as the 
whole network (Hoffmann, 2005).  Here is where DoD might be able to effectively 
establish the solar network and ensure that it runs efficiently and effectively.  By creating 
a center of competence, establishing formalized processes and generating standardized 
tools, DoD can ensure the network’s success over the long term. 
3. R&D: Methods to Forward Their Development 
a. Three Pathways to Create R&D Management 
R&D costs, as well as the risks have increased significantly in the recent 
years and as a consequence, more and more firms are collaborating on R&D (Doz, Ring 
& Olk, 2005).  DoD has not escaped this trend.  As funding continues to tighten and more 
scrutiny is placed on controlling costs, DoD will need to be able to live within it’s budget.  
One way DoD can minimize R&D costs is by forming what Doz et al. (2005) call a R&D 
consortium.  According to Doz et al. (2005), there are three critical factors for successful 
collaboration.  These are: 
• Presence of a strong sense of the participants’ convergent business 
interests and a feeling of urgency in addressing them prior to their 
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R&D collaboration, which provides an initial drive and 
commitment toward building the R&D consortia. 
• Pre-existence of social relationships that provide for initial and 
mutual understanding, which allow the partners to start 
collaborating more quickly and easily. 
• Pre-existence of strategic relationships (which are a function of 
firm strategies, competitive and market conditions), or at least of a 
sense of strategic interdependency that may lead to mutual 
forbearance and a desire to seek common ground. 
Doz et al. (2005) then suggests that there are three distinct processes on 
how R&D consortia form.  The first process is the emergent process.  This process is one 
that arises out of a threat7.  For example, China’s military is beginning to emerge as a 
threat to the United States military.  As China continues to grow and build its military, it 
will proportionally consume more energy resources that will have a potential impact on 
the United States and its military’s ability to meet emerging threats worldwide because of 
the scare energy resources.  To meet this threat, DoD could form a R&D consortia with 
other countries’ defense agencies, such as Japan or Britain’s Ministry of Defense, to 
establish a broad network in solar power/alternative energy resource development. 
The second process in which R&D consortia are formed is through an 
engineering process.  This process is usually started by a triggering entity, such as the 
benefits of collaboration visible to potential partners, helping them along the formation 
process, securing their various contributions in timely and harmonious fashion and 
reassuring them about their respective motives (Doz et al., 2005). One way this process 
would form is if DoD created a new office to develop, manage and execute a strategy for 
transformation to solar energy.  This strategy would act as the triggering mechanism that 
would simulate interest in solar energy firms and who would want to join the network. 
Finally, the third process for forming a R&D consortia is the embedded 
approach.  In the embedded formation process, the potential collaborators already enjoy 
strong social relationships at the onset of the alliance and have also often built strategic 
collaboration relationships (Doz et al., 2005).  An advantage of this process is that it 
                                                 
7 Research by Doz et al. (2005) was conducted and their results show an overwhelming trend that this 
type of process was a direct result of strong competition that could threaten a whole industry. 
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would take very little management oversight because relationships have already been 
formed and a network has been established.   
The most likely formation of an R&D consortia for DoD would be the 
emergent approach.  Threats to DoD could come in any fashion from the build-up of 
China’s military, to funding cuts from Congress.  Just like DoD, the solar companies also 
face threats in their industry and a joint venture between the two can help stave off any 
current or future threat. 
b. Four Different Ways to Manage R&D 
As globalization continues to emerge and rapidly gain steam, DoD will 
need to be able to meet the challenges of R&D for solar power and should not rule out 
joint co-operative R&D with foreign countries and businesses.  There are many ways for 
DoD to orchestrate the development of R&D in solar power.  According to Zedtwitz and 
Gassmann (2002), there are four ways that firms can manage their R&D development on 
an international scale, which are:  
• Domestic research and domestic development. 
• Dispersed research and domestic development. 
• Domestic research and dispersed development. 
• Dispersed research and dispersed development. 
These four examples offer DoD four different ways to enhance their solar 
power R&D development on both an international and national level. 
Domestic research and domestic development is called the national 
treasure R&D (Zedtwitz & Gassmann, 2002).  Here R&D is kept in house because it is 
critical to the national security of the United States.  On one side, this has potential 
benefits both economically and politically at home, however on the down side, it offers 
very little opportunity for DoD to engage with other firms outside of the United States 
who may have a better technological understanding of solar power development thus 
stunting growth opportunities.  On a more national level, DoD could completely conduct 
the research and development within its organization.  While this would further prevent  
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the likelihood that critical technology would be compromised, it is certain that from a 
financial standpoint, this complete in-house development and research is not feasible nor 
in the best interests of DoD. 
Dispersed research and domestic development might offer DoD a unique 
way to tap into the knowledge base of firms that have extensive solar background that are 
not located in the U.S..  For example, in DoD’s solar power network, if there were 
several companies that were conducting research both in the United States and abroad, if 
a particular company abroad has a better understanding of solar power technology, the 
benefit U.S. firms and DoD would enjoy is the knowledge flow from that company into 
the network.  By developing the products back in the U.S., DoD could have a significant 
effect on the local economy or national economy if a major product development was to 
take place that could transform the solar power industry. 
Domestic research and dispersed development could offer DoD a unique 
way to utilize U.S. firms and universities in research and also take advantage of low cost 
development opportunities.  The main problem with this approach is that it is a “market 
driven” model which means that business development is dominated by customer 
demands and not by scientific exploration (Zedwitz & Glassmann, 2002).  But would a 
“market driven” approach be really that bad?  DoD could act as a market driver for solar 
power by becoming a lead user.  From Dew’s (2006) article regarding the demand-pull 
effect with Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), we can see that demand pull, in 
certain circumstances, can shape the evolution of a technology considerably.  If DoD, 
created enough organized demand for solar power applications and technology 
requirements, it might just be able to transform the solar energy industry completely.  
One way DoD might be able to develop this organized demand is through joint ventures 
with other military organizations from our European allies.  In addition, if DoD were the 
lead buyer, their commitment to the solar industry might help reduce the market risk for 
companies and could then help to further future development of new solar technologies. 
Finally, dispersed research and dispersed development are truly the 
essence of global organization’s commitment to R&D.  While this approach maybe the 
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best approach for civilian firms on an international scale, it may not be in the best interest 
for DoD to fully commit towards a truly global R&D infrastructure, mainly because of 
the few national security issues that DoD would want to keep secret.  On a strictly 
national level, a network of this structure would be highly beneficial for DoD because it 
would help reduce costs, improve local economies and create a diverse knowledge flow 
of information between DoD and its partners. 
4. Challenges 
DoD will face several challenges by managing this diverse and complex network 
of solar companies and universities.  One such challenge will be to generate a corporate 
alliance policy, which will bind together these actors in this network.  A lack of 
company-wide rules on when, how and with whom to co-operate can lead to an 
unbalanced growth of alliances, which can negatively affect the performance of the 
individual alliances and how these strategies are implemented (Hoffmann, 2005).  For 
example, if there is no written alliance policy, one firm could be seen as getting 
preferential treatment from DoD, even if DoD’s intention was innocent,  which could 
then disrupt the productivity of other firms. 
Another challenge for DoD is to effectively manage this complex network and do 
so with minimal costs to DoD.  Goerzen (2005) states that a large and complex alliance 
network may add to a firm’s organizational costs by yielding an expensive, unwieldy and 
inefficient management structure for several reasons: 
• Suitable partners that possess unique resources and capabilities often exist 
outside of the focal firm’s known sphere of contacts which could result  in 
a higher initial search cost due to the difficulty in finding and assimilating 
information on potential partners. 
• Through this process of dealing with unfamiliar entities, the probability of 
adverse selection would increase and the process by which a firm extracts 
itself from an unproductive relationship is time-consuming and expensive. 
• Once a relationship is established, the new organizational routines would 
probably require higher monitoring costs given the partner’s lack of trust 
and familiarity with each other’s processes. 
As DoD builds their network of solar companies and universities another key 
challenge they face is how each individual firm impacts the other.  When a company has 
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a number of alliances, problems in one project can negatively impact other projects, 
while success, on the other hand, can benefit further joint activities (Hoffmann, 2005).  
To minimize this conflict of maximize the benefit, the firms should co-ordinate 
collaborative projects with the same partner (Hoffmann, 2005). 
Managing resources effectively will be a key challenge for DoD in the 
formulation of the network.  More specifically, DoD should be careful to protect the vital 
resources that the network has established and at the same time exploit to the fullest the 
potential of these resources.  In order to do this DoD needs to develop a sense of priority, 
or orientation, in managing this network (Das & Teng, 1999). 
Finally, a R&D challenge that DoD faces is selecting the right pathway to 
establish a R&D consortia.  For example, if DoD has been following the emergent 
process but a consensus on vision and mission issues has been slow to come.  Under 
these circumstances,, DoD may have to undertake the task of triggering collaboration and 
begin to employ an engineered process (Doz, et al., 2005). 
One key theme throughout the literature was that networks will fail if time, money 
and energy are not invested properly and with careful analysis on the impact of potential 
network partners.  DoD could help reduce this risk by using a newly formed department, 
which would be completely responsible for the management, execution and development 
of this network thus eliminating other constituencies from having to manage the network 
in an ad-hoc fashion. 
5. Summary 
Establishing a network with solar power companies and universities is critical for 
the long-term renewable energy strategy for DoD.  There are many different methods on 
how to manage a network and establish a robust R&D consortia.  This report suggests 
that DoD should actively research different methods and implement the one that fits best.  
In the process of establishing a network, DoD will face numerous challenges that will test 
its ability to effectively manage a diverse alliance of firms.  These challenges can be 
overcome by effectively laying out the foundation in conjunction with these firms, 
establishing good communication flow between entities, and formulating a long term 
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strategy that benefits every actor.  By incorporating a newly formed office within DoD 
for Solar and Renewable Energy, DoD can mitigate the impact of these challenges. 
C. MANAGING RISK 
1. Introduction 
Managing risk is becoming more and more important and challenging as costs, 
competition, and the complexity of the business environment increase.  As companies 
increase the complexity of their systems, (products, processes, technologies, 
organizational structures, contracts and so on) they often fail to pay sufficient attention to 
the introduction and proliferation of loopholes and flaws that increase the risk of 
involvement in a network (Bonabeau, 2007).  It is very important for DoD to understand 
the consequences of failing to manage risk in the solar environment.  Important questions 
then become: How can DoD manage the risk in the solar industry?  What benefits can 
successfully managing risk bring to DoD?  Finally, what guidelines could DoD follow to 
help minimize the impact of risk management?   
2. Managing Risk in Networks 
Das and Teng (1999) break down risk into two categories: relational and 
performance.  Relational risk is the risk of unsatisfactory inter-firm cooperation, and 
performance risk is all other factors that adversely affect network performance (Das & 
Teng, 1999).  In addition, they identify two primary resources that firms can contribute 
which are: property and knowledge.  For example, in the case of a solar power network, 
firms that are in the solar power industry could be responsible for the property while 
universities would be responsible for the knowledge background.  Both Das and Teng 
(1999) combined property, knowledge, relational risk and performance risk into a matrix 




Figure 19.   Strategic Alliance/Network Orientations for Primary Risks and Resources 
[From: Das & Teng]. 
 
Control orientation can be achieved by contractual, equity or managerial control.  
DoD, as the lead player can ensure that companies joining the network can feel 
comfortable that their properties will not be misused by stating clear and explicit 
circumstances on when, where and how their assets will be utilized through their network 
strategy policy.  Flexibility orientation offers a firm to be free of rigid, engaging and 
long-term agreements, enhancing the ability to adapt to changing circumstances (Das & 
Teng, 1999).  The security orientation relates to the fear firms have regarding their 
technical expertise is stolen from other firms in the network.  Even though one of the 
benefits of forming a network is to share knowledge there must also be a consideration 
for just how much knowledge sharing will occur, especially if there are competing firms 
in the same alliance.   Here DoD can minimize this impact by outlining limits to the 
sharing of critical information that could severely impact a firm’s technical knowledge 
advantage.  Finally, productivity orientation is when you have combination of 
performance risk and knowledge as your primary resource.  Is the firm able to produce a 
solid product even though they have the technical resources to do so?  In order to mitigate 
this, DoD can conduct an extensive background investigation on the firm’s past 
performance.  
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3. Guidelines for Managing Risk 
In order to help manage risk in a network, Williams (1996) points out three things 
firms can do to reduce the level of risk.  The first step a firm like DoD can take is to 
create a process-oriented view of risk management.  The second step is to build an 
effective organizational control structure, and finally the third step is to develop a 
common business risk language.  All of these steps could be incorporated into DoD’s 
solar energy strategy and policy, which would define how each one was going to affect 
other firms in the network. 
Guidelines for managing risk were noted by Das and Teng (1999).  They 
concluded that the managers of the network (DoD) would do very well if they followed 
these guidelines: 
• Emphasize protection of your own primary resource. 
• Exercise control through contracts, equity and management. 
• Retain flexibility through short-term recurrent contracts, limiting 
commitment, and effective exit provisions. 
• Safeguard continued security by limiting exposure to know-how. 
• Ensure increased productivity by emphasizing superior alliance 
performance. 
In addition to those listed above, Jorgensen (2005) noted five key elements of a 
solid risk management strategy.  The first element is to align risk management vision 
with that of the network.  Second, networks should identify and analyze the areas of 
potential risk to the network.  Third, networks should balance their risk objectives by 
determining how much time, effort and money it will take to achieve these objectives.  
According to Jorgensen (2005), a risk manager could use a balanced scorecard to clearly 
articulate these objectives.  Fourth, the gaps that develop after establishing the risk 
management objective should closed with strategic incentives.  Here DoD could work 
with key leaders in the firms to ensure that all risk is minimized as much as possible.  
Fifth, continual measurement should be taken to constantly monitor the progress of your 
risk management objectives.  If discrepancies arise, then they can be dealt with early on 
and will minimize their impact on the network.   
 83
4. Summary 
Risk is inevitable no matter how efficient or productive a network is.  The goal is 
to minimize the risk to the point where it doesn’t affect long term goals.  DoD can take 
numerous steps like the examples listed above to ensure that risk is minimized in the 
solar energy network.  As the lead actor in the network, it will be DoD’s responsibility to 
ensure that the firms involved in the network are also contributing to the reduction of 
risk.  By reducing and effectively managing risk, DoD can then utilize the time that 
would have been spent dealing with risk concerns/issues and instead help guide and 
nurture the network to achieve its goals. 
D. LEGISLATION AFFECTING SOLAR POWER 
1. Introduction 
As Americans continue to put an emphasis on “going green,” the transition from 
traditional energy sources to renewable sources will continue.  Politicians are not exempt 
from this emphasis and have the responsibility to secure America’s energy sources.  
However, as history shows, politicians flow with the population’s attitude.  Now, as 
America faces record high oil prices and current trends show no slowing of the rising 
costs, America certainly should look towards renewable energy sources. Solar power can 
secure America’s energy source for the future.  
2. Energy Tax Incentives for Solar Power 
a. Brief History of Energy Tax Incentives Since 1992 
  The Energy Policy Act of 1992 established a permanent 10 percent 
business energy tax credit for investments in solar power equipment (Buckner, 2007).  In 
1998-1999, America saw crude oil prices reach a low of just over $10 per barrel 
(Congressional Research Service [CRS], 2008).  However, after reaching this low point 
gas and oil prices began to rise.  By 2001, Congress was faced with fluctuating oil prices, 
an electricity crisis in California, and natural gas prices that were spiking because at one 
point, the spot market prices reached about $30 per million cubic feet (mcf), which was 
the equivalent of $175 per barrel of oil (CRS, 2008).  On March 9th, 2002 the Economic 
 84
Security and Recovery Act of 2001 was passed into public law 107-104.  This law 
provided a tax credit for electricity produced from renewable sources and amended the 
Internal Revenue Code to provide a two-year extension of electricity from renewable 
resources (Buckner, 2007).  The 108th Congress passed some energy tax incentives in the 
form of the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, which incorporated $146 billion of 
middle class and business tax breaks (CRS, 2008).  The 109th Congress passed 
substantial legislation in the form of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which created $2.6 
billion for renewable energy incentives such as business tax credits for solar power. 
b. Current Tax Issues 
On February 27, 2008, an old Energy Tax Provision (H.R. 3221) was 
reintroduced as a new bill (H.R. 5351) that contained $18.1 billion in renewable energy 
and energy efficiency incentives.  The main effect that this bill will have on solar power 
is that it will liberalize the 30 percent investment tax credit for business solar and will 
extend the credit for eight years (CRS, 2008).   This should be good news for DoD 
because it will help incentivize companies to pursue solar power investment, which 
means that DoD will have a more diverse portfolio of companies to choose from when 
forming the solar power network.  Currently in Congress there are two bills being 
produced in the House of Representatives (H.R. 5984) and Senate (S. 2821) that will 
form the Clean Energy Tax Stimulus of 2008 and extend the tax credits for solar 
investment until 2017.  
3. Recent and Pending Laws Affecting Solar Power 
The Solar Energy Research and Advancement Act of 2007 (H.R. 2774) was 
incorporated into the Energy Independence and Security Act which was signed into law 
on December 19th, 2007.  This law provided funding for research in thermal energy 
storage, studies on solar power integration into the electrical grid, a grant program that 
will help strengthen the solar industry workforce through training and internship 
programs and photovoltaic demonstration program in which grants will be given to states 
to demonstrate advanced photovoltaic technology (Library of Congress, 2008). 
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Another piece of legislation being considered is the New Direction for Energy 
Independency, National Security and Consumer Protection Act.  For solar power, this act 
establishes pilot programs for the development of strategic solar reserves on federal land.  
Currently this legislation was referred to the House Ways and Means Committee and is 
pending further review. 
E. SUMMARY 
There are multiple ways DoD might manage the solar power network.  Forming a 
cluster or using a triangular approach are just two of them. As DoD develops this 
complex network, it will face several challenges that will threaten the network’s ability to 
produce quality products.  If DoD does not actively engage these threats head on, the 
entire network could collapse.  To ensure that these challenges are met, DoD might 
consider investing the time, money and effort into establishing sound policies, strategies 
and organizational structure to the network. 
As in any organization, DoD should effectively manage the risk of creating a 
complex network of companies and universities.  The use of various methodologies will 
work and it will be DoD’s responsibility to find the right one that fits best within the 
network.  Only active management from DoD can help ensure that the risk in minimized 
to an acceptable level. 
Finally, new legislation is being considered to make solar power a more attractive 
alternative to traditional energy sources.  These incentives will create opportunities for 
companies involved with solar power to more actively engage in research, production and 
investment in solar power.  DoD can capitalize on this trend which will create a long term 










































In the mid to late 1970s, America faced an oil crisis.  The federal 
government acknowledged that there must be a plan of action to transition 
to other energy sources: 
Because we are now running out of gas and oil, we must prepare quickly 
for a third change, to strict conservation and to the use of coal and 
permanent renewable energy sources, like solar power. 
JIMMY CARTER, televised speech, April 18, 1977 
Unfortunately, this transition was short lived and the U.S. quickly got away from 
making the complete transformation to renewable energies as oil prices came down and 
the energy crisis dissolved.  Thirty-one years later, the U.S. is faced with another oil 
crisis and this time it shows no signs of improvement.  The current oil crisis we now face 
is threatening DoD’s ability to operate and is also having a significant impact in the U.S. 
economy.  However, this scenario is different and offers DoD a unique opportunity to 
capitalize on this current crisis.  What is significantly different is the environmentalism 
movement that has taken root and has now become an important part of U.S. companies 
to re-think how they do business in order to preserve the environment.  DoD can now 
position themselves to become the leader in the transformation from fossil fuels to 
renewable energy. 
B. CLOSING REMARKS 
1. Solar Power: A Secure, Reliable and Cost Competitive Energy Source 
After thorough analysis, we have concluded that while solar power is still not the 
overall most cost effective and efficient energy source for DoD on a large scale, it can be 
quite cost effective in certain niches.  As a result, solar power can become an important 
addition to DoD’s diverse renewable energy portfolio.  In addition, as costs for solar 
power continue to decrease and its efficiency continues to improve, solar power may 
make its case for further expansion into larger projects and encompass a wide range of 
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applications within DoD.  Finally, solar power is a secure and reliable energy source that 
can help provide DoD with its energy requirements for the future.  
2. Networking Offers DoD a Way to Exploit Solar Power 
DoD can help the advancement of solar power research, development, and the 
management of future military requirements by establishing a network of companies and 
universities that will interact with DoD and produce top grade solar products for the 
military.  There are many ways to develop a network, but DoD should give careful 
consideration in choosing the one that fits best.  This careful analysis on which network is 
the one that fits best will help reduce the challenges that DoD will face when establishing 
the newly formed network.  In addition, by selecting the right network DoD might be 
able to help reduce and effectively manage the risk both it and the other firms will 
assume in this process.   
3. DoD Can Play a Role in Driving Diffusion and Innovation 
If DoD is going to drive diffusion, it must comprehend the sources and effects of 
innovation uncertainty.  The three areas in which DoD should focus its knowledge on 
uncertainty are: potential uses; complimentary innovations; and the value and economic 
feasibility.  Each one must be carefully analyzed by DoD, so that it can be ready to make 
careful decisions.  There are several different ways to drive diffusion, but generally 
speaking, they can be categorized as demand-pull or supply-push activities.  DoD’s 
unique purchasing power, financing opportunities, and contracting channels could be a 
strong catalyst for driving the development of niche solar applications up the diffusion 
curve to mainstream status. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This report proposes recommendations for DoD to undertake in order to ready 
itself for the transformation away from fossil fuels: 
• Create an office under the Secretary of Defense to facilitate the 
development, management, and execution of the transformation to 
renewable energy. 
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• Prepare the acquisition community for the transformation from fossil fuels 
to solar power and other renewables.  Until the creation of the new 
department, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics) will be acting as the lead office in handling the transformation 
and should play a major role in assisting with this transformation. 
• Establish a reporting system to independently document electricity 
produced by solar energy at its bases for sharing with other bases, federal 
agencies, and private industry.  This would have to improve upon the 
current annual energy reports and have the potential to help facilitate 
market attention and foster increased learning. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Performance Measurement   
There are many ways in which firms can measure network performance.  Which 
one best fits the DoD network for solar power?  How would DoD and the associated 
firms respond to this analysis if it is negative?  What are management options DoD could 
undertake to offset any negative trends? 
2. Solar Technology Ready for the Field 
While this paper took more of a strategic look into how DoD could influence and 
manage the transition to solar power one thing that was not covered was exactly what 
solar products, already in existence, could have an immediate impact on DoD’s 
operational capabilities? 
3. Political Impact of Lobbying for Solar Power 
How could DoD influence the transformation to solar energy through lobbying 
Congress?  What roadblocks would DoD face?  Are there any legal implications or ethics 
considerations DoD must consider?  What strategy could DoD take to leverage Congress 
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